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Abstract  
This thesis examines the economic rationale of anti-dumping. The matter is first approached 
from a fundamental level comparing anti-dumping with competition law. Thereafter the case 
of Norwegian salmon is presented and industry context added, before the anti-dumping 
proceedings are presented comprehensively. The main focus is on the alternative methods to 
establish normal value when there is no viable home market, as this exercise raises a number 
of intriguing cost allocation problems. Finally, status quo on the salmon case and anti-
dumping rules expected evolution is briefly addressed.  
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Introduction 
This thesis is written with the overall intention to approach international trade law from an 
economic rather than a juridical point of view. The author is convinced that an in-dept study 
of this legal field’s economic rationale is valuable. The thesis provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the legal agreements economic rationale, with illustrative examples from 
the ongoing Salmon case. 
It is also the author’s aim to transfer an idea of the complexity surrounding anti-dumping 
proceedings and the arbitrariness that can trigger legal actions under the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement (ADA)1.  
The ADA and its related proceedings are extensive and provide multiple possibilities to 
problematize from a juridical point of view.  However, as an economist it is more interesting 
to assess how the juridical provisions fulfil economic rationality standards. In an extensive 
legal area this thesis focuses primarily on those legal aspects with most economic substance 
both on a general and more detailed level. Thus, within the boundaries for this kind of thesis 
and in order to provide the reader with both breadth for general understanding and dept for 
detailed analysis, the level of interpretation differs between the thesis’ sections and parts2. 
The legal articles covered in this thesis, although relatively few in number and length of text, 
are the most substantial for basic comprehension of anti-dumping.   
It should also be clarified that this is not a thesis on socio economic effects from distortion 
of trade. These effects are well documented3. This thesis rather shows on what foundation 
these trade interventions are based. 
Finally, the thesis could be read by anyone with academic or professional interest within the 
field of anti-dumping. The most practical chapters on cost allocations should be especially 
relevant for salmon farming companies. As the thesis also shows the integration between 
politics, law and economics the author would also recommend the reading for legal 
practitioners and policy makers.  
                                                 
1 Article VI of the GATT 
2 An overview of the thesis with respect to the different articles of the legal provisions is given in annex I. 
3 Asche et al. (2005) and any textbook on international trade 
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1.1 Outline 
The first part of this thesis gives the reader an introduction to the field of anti-dumping law. 
Special emphasis is put on the fundamental rationale behind the agreement, in an economic 
perspective. Without the necessary understanding of the basic assumptions and intentions 
behind this legal instrument, further analysis would easily fall victim to a lack off 
perspective and reference.   
The second part starts with a general introduction to the dynamics of the salmon industry, 
and continues with an overview of the most important features in anti-dumping proceedings, 
with a main focus on the legal concept of normal value (NV). 
The third part on constructed normal value (CNV) goes deeper into, and discusses some 
intriguing technicalities of the agreement. There are also other areas within the agreement 
where economic implications are of relevance. However, in the author’s view the procedure 
of CNV’s is a specific area where accounting and economic logic is essential. Throughout 
this part, the case of Norwegian salmon will provide the reader with illustrative examples. 
The fourth and last part explains how dumping is finally determined, and measures imposed. 
The last part also addresses general perspectives on the ADA negotiations in the Doha 
round. Finally, there is a conclusion linking the different parts together, and summarizing the 
most important findings regarding the economic rationale of anti-dumping.4   
1.2 Methodology 
This thesis is based on a broad base of literature and juristic writing. The literature consists 
of textbooks and articles, especially on anti-dumping, but also on the salmon industry and 
general economics. The case law is from both the EC and WTO systems, whereas the recent 
EU/WTO case of Norwegian salmon is a focal point. In this case the voluminous written 
pleadings have been studied in order to gain deeper knowledge on practical issues. Owing to 
strict confidentiality clauses the case data is not fully comprehensive; even so it has been 
possible to identify the main areas of disagreement for further analysis.    
                                                 
4 Appendix II shows the scope of this thesis with respect to the ADA provisions.  
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PART I
2 General overview of dumping. 
This chapter will provide the reader with basic insights to the concept of dumping. Firstly, 
dumping5 is presented as it applies in domestic law. This is not analogous as to how 
dumping is defined in an international context (anti-dumping), which is explained 
subsequently. In the last section the economic rationale of anti-dumping will be thoroughly 
discussed.  
2.1 Domestic dumping 
In a domestic setting dumping is rightfully and commonly understood as selling a product 
under its cost. The problem of this test is related to which cost to use. Economic textbooks 
will usually recommend the use of marginal cost (MC), as it can hardly be rational under any 
circumstance to sell under MC.  
In practice it has proven difficult to measure MC, thus alternative methods have 
investigated. One alternative as suggested by Areeda and Turner (1975) has been the use of 
average variable cost (AVC) as this lower threshold. As an upper threshold is the average 
total cost (ATC). Pricing below ATC is prohibited in EC law given predatory intentions. 6
Selling under full cost of production (COP), (but over VC), is thus not illegal per se. It is a 
generally accepted business practice, especially in cyclical industries, that firms occasionally 
sell under full COP. 7  
The harmful effect of dumping happens when firms are driven out of an industry, and new 
firms discouraged to enter, by a dumping firm that later takes advantage of the monopolistic 
situation to recoup losses. This is called predatory pricing and is anticompetitive behaviour 
which EC law seeks to prevent (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2001). 
                                                 
5 Normally, predatory pricing or predation is used in the domestic setting while dumping is reserved for the international 
variant. As we will learn the legal meaning is very different. 
6 This holds at least for EEA countries and USA. 
7 Take notice that the municipal laws between the US and the EC differ fundamentally on the question of how domestic 
dumping is defined. Basically, while the EC approach is average cost based while the US uses variable cost. Consequently, 
the latter method is considerably more restrictive upon findings of dumping, penalizing just the most extreme cases.   
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 There are few proven examples of successful implementations of predatory pricing strategies 
even though scholars have been studying the field for decades. According, to McGee (1958) 
it can often be illogical to engage in predatory pricing if one wishes to monopolize a market 
because it is less expensive to acquire them. Thus, it can be argued that predatory pricing is 
most a theoretical notion. Even though e.g. the recent and well-known EC French 
Telecom/Wanadoo case shows that it certainly can be a rational long run business strategy8. 
The undesirable effects emerge when predatory pricing is used as a strategy to drive 
competitors out of the market. This entails the situation where the firm abandons its short 
term profit maximisation (loss minimisation) strategy and is running at a self inflicted loss. 
From an economic point of view (and legal), this practice could be harmful to competition 
and is therefore regulated by domestic competition law. Thus, the competition law protects 
competition not the competitors (Steiner & Woods, 2003). 
Predatory pricing further suggests that the firms must benefit from some significant degree 
of market power. Predatory pricing makes no sense in a perfectly competitive market. 
Finally, predatory pricing does not relate to selling below the COP of competitors. It is not 
illegal to be more cost efficient and to use this competitiveness to undercut prices. This is 
commonly accepted as fair competition, and is the fundamental mechanism that market 
economy is built on.  
2.1.1 European Community law: Article 82 
In EC law dumping is governed by Article 82 of the EC Treaty. Given that a company has a 
dominant position in the relevant market, certain behaviour of non-competitive nature is 
perceived as illegal. Identical behaviour would be legitimate if performed likewise by a non-
dominating firm. Abusive behaviour includes exploitative abuse and anti-competitive abuses 
(ibid). An example of exploitative abuse is found in the canonical United brands case where 
discriminatory and unfair pricing was found9. An example of the anti-competitive abuse 
(predatory pricing) was given in the AKZO case where the Commission stated that it was 
necessary to assess both the firms cost efficiency and motives. The ECJ agreed with the 
                                                 
8 Reputation for toughness (American Airlines) and the ability to decrease the potential for external financing of competing 
firms can be additional reasons for predatory behaviour.  
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Commission that there was a distinction in law terms, between lowering prices in order to 
win new customers and trying to eliminate a competitor (Steiner & Woods, 2003). 
2.2 International Anti-dumping 
“If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its 
own home market, it is said to be “dumping” the product. Is this unfair competition? The 
WTO agreement does not pass judgement”10. (wto.org) 
As informally stated above, within the legal framework of the ADA the meaning of dumping 
is different from the domestic case, as it does not necessarily relate to selling under 
(variable) cost. Furthermore, it does not include any reference to non-competitive behaviour 
and there is not even a consideration of objective,11 as can be seen underneath. 
ADA Art. 2.1: “For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as 
being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its 
normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another 
is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product 
when destined for consumption in the exporting country”. 
 
 
The ADA merely states, stripped of its juridical language, that dumping by law relates to the 
practice of selling under domestic prices in another members market. This applies regardless 
of any profit margins. Thus, a firm can sell with a profit both in the home market and in the 
foreign market and still be charged with dumping allegations when the export price is lower 
than domestic price.12   
There is also an additional condition13 that must be met before a dumping allegation can be 
filed. There must be actual injury14 to the domestic industry of the importing country and a 
causal link must be established between the dumped imports and the injury affecting the 
                                                                                                                                                      
9 However, this was reversed dumping (charging excessively high prices). 
 
11 Koulen (1995)   
12 As prices, as we will see later are adjusted for differences back to an ex-factory level, it is stringently more correct to say 
mark-up than price. 
13 In the EC there is an additional condition of Community interest which will be discussed later.  
14 Threat of injury or material retardation is also included but this provision is “very rarely used” (Stevenson, 2005). 
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domestic industry15. This is intuitive as there would be no need to impose trade restrictions 
in the absence of a domestic industry16.      
The following figure summarizes the fundamental question of economic rationale which will 
be discussed next. A flow diagram of the entire anti-dumping process can be found in 
Appendix I.   
 
Figure 1: Basic differences between domestic and international legislation. 
2.3 Economic reasoning for Anti-Dumping  
This section presents and discusses the economic rationale of anti-dumping in a general 
sense. The direct implications for the salmon case will de discussed in chapter 5 and 
thereafter. 
The scientific definition of dumping was first formulated by Viner (1923), as “price 
discrimination between national markets”. This definition also includes the cases where 
products are sold at a higher price in the foreign market; so-called reversed dumping. In the 
ADA reversed dumping is not treated as an illegal practice17. Viner also introduced two 
alternative approaches, now formalized in the ADA, when there are no domestic sales. They 
are both evenly included in the ADA. However, the use of full cost as a surrogate for the 
                                                 
15 ADA Art 5.2 
16 Note that dumping in the competing industry’s most important export market is not illegal under the ADA. 
17 Obviously this is bad news for a country like Norway where the purchasing power is very high. 
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domestic price is strongly preferred. It is important to note that the alternatives are not to be 
used together with the price discrimination method. The cost based alternative to a certain 
degree moves the economic sense back to the domestic definition of sales below cost. As an 
illustration of what constitutes as dumping, the following table will clarify, but not rationally 
explain as such a table can the legal concept (Stevenson, 2005): 
 Situation 1 Situation 2 
Normal Value 
(Domestic price) 
100 60 
Cost of production 80 80
Export price 90 60
Dumping? YES YES 
 
Table 1: Stylized example of dumping 
The price discrimination criteria is used in situation 1, as there is no price discrimination in 
situation 2, but sales under cost the alternative criteria is used here. Both methods lead to 
finding of dumping and the labelling of exporters selling at “unfair prices”. 
It is quite clear that the economist Viner has had a material impact on the current ADA 
wording and the common understanding of dumping as an unfair practice even though Viner 
himself did not use the term unfair but rather addressed dumping as questionable. The whole 
concept of dumping and many misinterpretations are related to the massive development of 
trade and economic theory without the ADA being reformed e.g. at Viner’s time there were 
no separate anti-subsidy laws. (Kerr, 2001) 
As noted in Van Bael & Bellis (2005) a number of economists argue that the perception that 
dumping is unfair is mistaken and some even suggest there is no economic justification. The 
various arguments will be evaluated next, having the above table in mind.   
The only truly illegitimate dumping from an economic perspective, is thus behaviour 
relating to injuring predatory pricing, which mostly intentionally but in some extraordinary 
cases also unintentionally lead to loss of healthy competition by ruining the industry in the 
target market. 
Unfortunately, the injury is often difficult to assess a priori and uncompetitive behaviour 
difficult to define exactly. This might be the reason why the ADA’s dumping definition in 
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practice is considerably wider than both anti-trust law and the economic view on illegal 
practice. While anti-trust law shall protect competition and ultimately the consumers, anti-
dumping law seeks to protect the competitors from what is de jure defined as “unfair” 
practice18. 
2.3.1 Dumping as unfair practice       
The term “unfair trade” 19 is commonly utilized by anti-dumping supporters in connection 
with dumping. Unfairness is undoubtedly a discussable concept. The use of the negatively 
charged words “dumping” and “unfair price” will give the complaining industry public and 
political support, even though the substance of the allegations is not necessarily as clear cut 
as the negative labels would indicate. In this respect it will certainly be beneficial to assess 
the basic rationale of firm’s price discriminating or under cost sales. First, the EC view on 
“unfairness” will be cited:  
“Dumping is an unfair trade practice, because the lower export prices are not a result of 
greater efficiency on the part of the exporting producers, but of distorted market conditions 
illustrated by the segregation of the domestic market”. (ec.EUROPA.eu, 2007, NR1)20
The explanation given to why greater efficiency could not be a relevant factor is the 
following: “If the exporting producer had a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the producers 
in the importing country, this would, in open international markets, not only lead to low 
export prices but also to low prices on the domestic market of the exporter” (ibid) . 
In order to investigate the rationale of firms market behaviour in light of the dumping-related 
statements of the EU. First the relevant aspects of the domestic market will be addressed. In 
the next section this insight is coupled with firm’s rational profit maximizing behaviour.   
2.3.1.1 Domestic market conditions 
The EC further states that a common feature for dumping countries is a distorted or 
sanctuary home market which enables cross-subsidization. “Typical examples of distortions 
leading to dumping include: Significant tariff and non-tariff barriers, insufficient 
                                                 
18 Advocate General Van Greven in the Nölle case, Van Bael and Bellis (2005) 
19 In that context it can be mentioned that the concept of unfair pricing was raised by Canadian customs authorities as there 
existed a practise of invoicing artificially low prices to escape duty. (Kerr, 2001)    
 8
enforcement of competition rules, export tax breaks, artificially low raw material and/or 
energy prices”. A sanctuary market to subsidize from is the major argument in favour of the 
current ADA for current anti-dumping law supporters, according to Van Bael & Bellis 
(2005). The argument, per se, is to some extent valid but also relates to the anti-subsidy and 
countervailing agreements as will be shown subsequently: 
  
- Subsidies; are unfair and distorting as long as they apply dissimilarly between 
industries. This is commonly accepted by economists as unfair. There are explicit 
provisions under the WTO Agreement dealing specifically with subsidies. The anti-
subsidy agreement makes sure that legal and political conditions are uniform across a 
nation, so no particular industry is given support relative to others. The basic idea is 
that if the same political and legal rules apply to all companies they do not form part 
of a national strategy to outdistance certain foreign industries in an unfair manner 
(wto.org). 
- Segregated markets; are created by market barriers as e.g. tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. The basic idea is that price discrimination between domestic sales and 
exports imply some kind of market protection in the domestic market, allowing the 
producers to cross subsidize their “dumped” exports. In cases were the home market 
is protected by tariffs and non-tariff barriers etc. the relevant provision should be the 
GATT 1994 agreement and the EC Trade Barrier Measures (Stevenson, 2005). 
Segregated markets can also steam from other external factors as uncompetitive 
markets caused by e.g. few competitors or strong customers preferences for the home 
product/brand. If no objectionable market protection measures are in place, others 
than those of the natural competitive forces no economically unfair segregation of 
markets exist, apart from an imbalance of opportunities. (Van Bael & Bellis 2005) 
The natural factors creating diverging framework conditions can relate to multiple 
interrelated and complex factors given by e.g. country development, labour markets, 
natural endowments, political and legal systems, culture etc. Adjusting for all these 
factors is evidently not possible, thus all companies to some degree compete on 
different premises. Is this unfair? One might argue, but economists would not. 
                                                                                                                                                      
20 These are not formal interpretations. Nevertheless, they illustrate the ambiguity of AD in a forceful manner. 
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Anyway, it is unrealistic to try to make them equal across borders, as it is perfectly 
normal that basic conditions differ also within countries.  
The above discussion shows the problem of mixing arguments, even though they might be 
right they are not relevant for anti-dumping. The other basic aspect to take notice of and 
which will be further discussed is that the Commission does not take natural explanations 
into account when determining dumping by law.  
In any case, the existence of these sanctuary markets would, from an economic point of 
view, be more interesting as an internal affair of the exporting country. A sanctuary market 
subsidizing foreigners at the domestic consumer’s expense should be a matter for that 
county’s antitrust law and not antidumping.  That is however another debate.  
2.3.1.2 Firms profit maximising behavior 
The factors related to sanctuary markets are linked to both COP through subsidization and 
the possibility to price discriminate. Further and perhaps more relevant for anti-dumping the 
companies pricing behaviour will be discussed in order to establish under what conditions 
and in which situations firms decide to price-discriminate or sell under costs. After all 
current anti-dumping law in practice applies to firms.21  
 
- Market power:  In EC domestic anti-trust law a dominant position is a prerequisite to 
be charged with dumping. With no market power, there is no pricing power, and with 
no pricing power, anti-competitive behaviour should not be rational. A dominant 
position implies at least 20-25 % market share in the relevant market for one single 
firm. Firms can also have collective dominance, typically in oligopolies, but then the 
problem is usually excessively high prices not dumping (Steiner & Woods, 2003). 
Firms without individual market power are “price takers” and cannot affect the 
market price significantly. Price takers are forced to accept the price the market 
provides if they want to continue in business.  
 
                                                 
21 Formally measures apply to export from a country “imports of farmed salmon originating in Norway”. Council 
Regulation (EC) 85/2006. ADA art: 6.10 “The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for 
each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation” 
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- Supply conditions: Every firm will try to fix its volume according to expectations 
about competitor’s behaviour and demand development in order to maximize profits. 
The resource commitment at determining volume is essential for the firm’s later 
profit maximizing alternatives. The firm’s decision to produce more than the profit 
maximizing with the intention to depress prices can be a predatory action, even 
though the pricing at a later stage is not. 
 
- Price discrimination: The economic rationale of price discrimination between 
national markets is quite obvious and stretches far beyond those few situations where 
price discrimination is not profit maximizing (loss-minimizing). As far as the price 
elasticity of national markets differ, companies with monopolistic power will have 
perfectly rational incentives to perform price discrimination (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 
2001). So when price elasticity is higher in foreign markets than in the home market 
there are economic incentives to charge lower international prices or using ADA 
terminology; to engage in “condemnable dumping” (Vermulst, 2005). Price elasticity 
can differ between markets for numerous reasons. Most important factors are 
competition from other firms and demand conditions. Rational firms will 
accommodate to those exogenously given factors. Firms will typically have less 
market power in a foreign market forcing them to sell at lower prices.  
 
- Price strategies: The pricing behaviour discussed above is classical market or 
competition based pricing dependent on price elasticises. There are also other pricing 
strategies as e.g. penetration pricing which is to undercut prices in order to win 
market shares in a market where the exported product is unknown and the domestic 
firms has some degree of market power built up over years. (Pindyck & Rubenfeld, 
2001) 
 
- Sunk cost: The economic concept of “sunk cost” is essential to understand the 
pricing behaviour of individual firms. The definition in Horngren et al (1999) is: “a 
cost that has already been incurred and, therefore, is irrelevant to the decision 
process”.   While there might undoubtedly be predatory motives in exceptional cases 
there are also important non-predatory explanations to selling at lower or under cost 
prices in some business situations. Cyclical dumping or occasional dumping happens 
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when supply or demand conditions lead to excessive supply. Under these conditions 
there are two loss minimizing alternatives: 
  
i) Reduce production; this is only possible if resource commitment is low, 
production period short and fixed costs are low.  
ii) Sell at reduced prices; if the product is already produced, as might be the case 
for perishable products the seller must accept any price the market is willing 
to give. If a product’s “sunk cost” is NOK 10, the cost to finish the product is 
NOK 3, and the market price is NOK 5. It will be rational to sell at NOK 5 
and incur a NOK 8 instead of NOK 10 loss. Thus, in the short run all costs 
can be fixed.22.   
 
As we have seen EC competition law does not prohibit sales at under average cost when the 
intention is not predatory, the reason being that it is rational business behaviour to pursue 
loss minimizing strategies. Price discrimination is a problem only if unreasonable high 
prices are charged. In the domestic context this behaviour is not condemned as it is not 
subsidized by any sanctuary market with supra-normal profits (Van Bael & Bellis, 2005) 
However, there is nothing in the ADA referring to the investigation of cross subsidization 
possibilities hence this argumentation is not robust.   
 
In an international context sales below cost are claimed to export unemployment, as cyclical 
downturns can shift production volumes to export markets. This might be somewhat true, but 
it should be an inherent feature of global markets to share market volatility risks. Countries 
cannot choose only the benefits of international integration when the trade practices 
employed by competing nations are economic sound. In addition, the cyclical downturn can 
result from multiple factors some that are not necessarily linked to the exporter concerned. 
Finally, an alternative measure to avoid large volumes of low priced exports is the safeguard 
measure, which is designed for the case of fair but injurious imports. (ibid)  
 
                                                 
22 Note that there might be differences between the perceptions of what constitutes fixed cost; this might affect firms 
behaviour. E.g. countries as Japan where labour is seldom laid of will continue producing where countries with more 
flexible labour reduce production. (Van Bael & Bellis, 2005). 
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2.3.2 The inherent problem 
The inherent problem with economic theory is that there is no clear definition of what is 
actually predatory behaviour. It is obvious that the true intention of a business setting is 
much easier to asses in posterior, than in advance. Thus, there is a danger that the damage is 
done before the measures are imposed, as firms engaged in strong but healthy competition 
might be unrightfully charged with dumping. A suggestion to reform anti-dumping law has 
been to apply both the price discrimination and the sales under cost simultaneously. (Kerr, 
2001)  The problem is however that predatory pricing using the “deep pocket” strategy 
cannot be ruled out, conversely it is not difficult to prove that firms can both sell under cost 
and price discriminate at the same time without there being any predatory motive at all.  
The reasons explained above are also the reasons that competition law differ between 
developed countries. While the US set high hurdles for predatory pricing the EC is slightly 
less restrictive on its use of competition law. Nevertheless the basic sense is chiefly in line. 
At the other extreme is the ADA which can be applied in a wide range of cases as long as 
injury can be detected23. As we will se injury can easily be established in depressed markets. 
Even though no perfect legal framework has yet been proposed by economists, there is little 
doubt that the ADA is in need of a serious theoretical makeover and that almost any 
confining contribution signify a strengthening of the law’s economic substance. (ibid)  
2.3.3 Summary of economic reasoning 
The ADA seeks to level for differences in pricing behaviour between national markets or 
subsidiary the practice of selling under full cost. With no statement of objective, the ADA 
has a very broad definition of what can be determined as dumping and thus, “unfair trade”. 
There is little doubt that there within the definitions can be identified uncompetitive and 
hence unfair trade practices. However, the problem of a broad and ambiguous definition is 
that also normal and commonly accepted business practice can potentially fall victim to this 
definition.   
Regarding the “sanctuary market” logic, there is unfortunately little emphasis on grouping 
explanations for cost differences like effectiveness, unique capabilities, and natural 
resources etc. on one “natural” side and “artificial” explanations like differentiated taxes, 
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subsidies etc. in order to apply the appropriate measures, this will be better emphasized in 
later sections.  
Regarding firms pricing behaviour, there is no legal emphasis on investigating possible 
rational and acceptable justifications for the behaviour observed. This is a central aspect of 
domestic dumping proceedings, but irrelevant according to anti-dumping law. The EC 
reasoning that true competitive advantage would lead to overall lower prices in open markets 
is flawed because it does not take into account that even though markets are open, they do 
not necessarily have identical market dynamics. Firms will react rationally towards those 
market differences.  
To sum up, the most disturbing feature of anti-dumping supporter’s argumentation is its lack 
of sound economic substance. As noted by Van Bael & Bellis (2005): “The popularity of 
anti-dumping as an instrument of trade policy seem to have less to do with economic theory 
than with the fact that constitutes a form of safeguard action permissible under the WTO”.  
The repeated use of the term “unfair trade”24 is a common feature in populist argumentation, 
which is often without a deeper economic rationale. The lack of fundamental understanding 
of the WTO agreement and its facets and the confusing introduction of political arguments 
certainly does not ease the rationality debate. (ec.EUROPE.eu, 2007).  
2.4 Political issues  
The field of international anti-dumping is pervaded by international politics. Anti-dumping 
law is a possible way to protect domestic industry against foreign competition when other 
trade barriers are built down. The political dimension of international anti-dumping law 
makes this field especially complex and arbitrary as the disputes and their outcome are often 
lifted to a political level. 
2.4.1 Biased of investigating authorities 
The factor of prejudice is a potential problem in anti-dumping cases as the law enforcement 
is the competence of quasi judicial national competition authorities. In the EU the relevant 
                                                                                                                                                      
23 In the US defence based on the non-existence of injury has proven to be the only successful defence. (Stevenson, 2005) 
24 E.g. recital 117 in Council Regulation 85/2006. 
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authority is the Commission. The inherent biasness is a problem which is avoided in 
competition law, when only involving domestic firms. Expanding the WTO institutions 
authority to also include anti-dumping investigation could have eased the problem of 
inconsistent law application and biased investigating authorities (IA). However, it is unlikely 
that nations will accept a loss of control over their trade policies.    
2.4.2 High politics; the Doha negotiations. 
There are two major blocks in the current Doha negotiations, “the friends of Anti-Dumping” 
vs. EU/USA25. Generally speaking, the political block of the friends of anti-dumping wants 
to narrow the IA’s discretion margin and pursue a more objective anti-dumping legislation. 
The opponents (mainly USA/EU) have political interest in having as much manoeuvrability 
in their trading policies as possible. In paragraph 28 of the Doha Declaration on WTO rules, 
the negotiation room was effectively confined through the following statement:  
“In light of experience and of the increasing application of these instruments by 
members, we agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines 
under Article VI of the GATT…, while preserving the basic concepts, principles and 
effectiveness of these Agreements and their instruments and objectives…” 
(WTO.org)  
As we can understand the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness implies that no 
fundamental changes can be expected during the ongoing negotiations. Despite this 
negotiators constraints to enhance fundamental changes to the ADA, many smaller 
suggestions, especially from the “friends” of anti dumping have a sound economic rationale. 
Some of them are presented briefly underneath.  
Basic issues discussed at the Doha summit with relevance for this thesis: 
I) The friends suggest that alternative explanations for injury as e.g. internationally   
depressed prices, to avoid situations as in the US-Canada tomato case where bilateral 
anti-dumping cases were launched in a slump and with farmers at both sides of the 
boarders incurring losses26; 
II) moreover the friend suggests that the levels of industry support for a anti-dumping 
complaint must be raised considerably to avoid anti-dumping launches for 
                                                 
25 Note that the friend’s are the most reformists. 
26 Barichello, 2002 
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harassment purposes. As the costs of the case are normally born by the IA, barriers 
are low to file an Anti-dumping complaint; 
III) moreover the friends suggest increased transparency and fairness in anti-dumping 
proceedings. This is now also supported by the US/EC as faced with increased 
number of anti-dumping charges from developing countries; 
IV) moreover the friends want abolished the practice of excluding sales below cost 
when determining NV;  
V)  moreover the friends suggests that the practice of adding normal profits to full 
cost when constructing NV and the tendency to “err to the high side” when COP is 
established should be reformed. Especially taking into account that dumping often 
coincides with depressed markets; 
VI) moreover the practice of zeroing should be completely abandoned27.   
In the Doha negotiations it is evident that protectionist motives play an important role for    
many countries standpoint in the legal debates, especially those who traditionally are the 
most eager to apply these measures. Ideally protectionist motives should have been replaced 
with more objective ones based on socio-economic optimization. This would certainly limit 
the “effectiveness” of the ADA as a protectionist weapon.     
2.5  Other protective measures in the EC.  
As already mentioned the Basic Regulation is not the only trade protection measure 
instrument allowed under the WTO Agreement28. In order to properly set the context the 
other two most relevant measures will briefly be explained in turn. Both these measures are 
or have been relevant for the salmon case. Practices falling under these measures should be 
targeted with the most appropriate measures, even though overlapping cases might exist.  
2.5.1 Safeguards 
In cases where no price discrimination or other unfair trade practices exists, safeguard 
measures can temporarily be imposed if there is serious injury to domestic industry related to 
sudden and sharp increases to import volumes. Safeguards are often used in cases where 
                                                 
27 The issues will be revisited subsequently. 
28 The EC has five basic measures of trade protection. (Van Bael & Bellis, 2005) 
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dumping conditions are not met; the character of a safeguard is more explicitly protectionist 
than anti dumping and can be described as a political “safety valve”. The economic rationale 
of the safeguards is to give the troubled industry protection during a reasonable time to 
adjust to new market conditions, so they are per definition temporary. (WTO.org)    
2.5.2 Anti-subsidy & countervaillance 
Anti-dumping should not be confused with different kinds of illegal state subsidies, as these 
are regulated by separate WTO legal texts. The ADA concerns the potential unfair pricing 
decisions of the individual firm in an international context, not direct and discriminatory acts 
by governments. Whereas the ADA targets indirect effect of favourable domestic market 
condition, the Anti-subsidy Agreement targets specific government subsidies to singular or 
segments of firms or industries. This point is important to bear in mind when trying to 
understand the underlying rhetoric behind the ADA. Even though there are many differences 
between these two fields of law, they converge at many points. Consequently, some 
countries have incorporated these provisions jointly into their domestic law. This is not the 
case for the EC law and this paper (WTO.org). 
3 Investigation bodies and sources of law  
The institutional and legal aspects of anti-dumping are far-reaching. From a legal point of 
view the relationship between EC municipal law and WTO law, the institutional status, the 
law enforcement and direct effects etc. are substantial and important questions. It is outside 
the scope of this thesis to go in further detail. This section will therefore take a descriptive 
approach highlighting the most relevant aspects from a pragmatic point of view. 
3.1 WTO and the Anti-dumping Agreement 
The WTO is a supranational organization which is created in order to help facilitate trade 
and trade negotiations. The WTO agreements and institutions have gradually evolved since 
GATT 1947. The ADA is found implemented in the GATT 1947 as chapter VI and set the 
standards for the member’s domestic implementations. The dispute settlement bodies are 
supranational institutions created to solve trade disputes between members.    
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3.1.1 The anti-dumping agreement 
The ADA is the main provision for the WTO salmon case. The ADA is also the most 
important overall, as the Basic Regulation must be in conformity, hence interpretations will 
normally be done with reference to the ADA for the purpose of this thesis. 
The ADA is the international agreement regulating common anti-dumping legislation for 
trade among its members. The national states have discretion to implement their own 
dumping legislation within the legal frames set out by the ADA. In the fields where the ADA 
is blurry, there is more room for discretion in domestic law and its interpretations.  There is 
no obligation on the member states either to adopt or enforce any anti-dumping law under 
the WTO Agreement29. (wto.org).  
The Anti-dumping measures provided by the WTO Agreement have gained popularity 
during the last years as other trade barriers have been built down. Anti-dumping trade 
restrictions are now utilized y a greater number of trading countries than ever. The growth 
has been most substantial among developing and emerging countries. (Vermulst, 2005) 
 
3.1.2 WTO Dispute settlement bodies  
WTO member’s municipal anti-dumping law must be implemented in conformity with the 
ADA. In cases where members claim unlawful application of municipal anti-dumping law 
the case can be put before a Panel, created on member’s specific request. The WTO does 
encourage the use of negotiations in order to solve trade disputes. This is normally perceived 
as a less aggressive from a political point of view. However, if no amicable solution can be 
achieved a Panel is finally established.  
The panel will not make any review of the case, but investigate whether the complaining 
members IA has manoeuvred within the discretion they are provided by the ADA. The 
panel investigates both whether the municipal implementation is in accordance with the 
ADA and whether the IA’s proceedings have been in line with the principles drawn in the 
ADA. Roughly one could say that the Panel evaluation is based on what an objective 
investigating authority could do, not necessarily what they should do. This is a notable 
                                                 
29 The proportion that has adapted the ADA provisions into domestic law is xxx 
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point as many disputes stem from diverging views in questions with some room for 
interpretation.   
The Panel generally has limited authority and a very confined discretion. Consequently, 
rulings are seldom neither path-breaking nor unambiguous. When forced to make 
interpretations an incremental and conservative approach is favoured.  
The Panels decision can be appealed to the appellate body. It is not unusual that cases are 
appealed as there is considerable political prestige involved and little to loose. There are 
several examples of the appellate body overruling some of the Panels interpretations.   
3.2 The European Community and the Basic Regulation  
Private entities are not faced with the ADA. The relevant provisions for third countries 
exporting to the EC, is the Basic Regulation30. Even though some EC regulations are plain 
copies from the ADA and the Basic Regulation is, or at least should be, consistent with the 
ADA. However, as will be further developed, differences exist in practice. The EC 
investigating authority is the Commission which decisions are applicable for legal scrutiny 
revision by the domestic courts.      
As already touched upon the main authority in EC antidumping law is the Commission. The 
Council, with delegates from member states, also has a formally expressed role. The EC 
member states have additional participation through the Advisory Committee which is a 
body entitled to comment on Commission decisions.  
3.2.1 The EC bodies  
The Commission is the EU’s investigating authority (IA). The Commission is politically 
independent and shall represent the interests of the EC as a whole. The Commission enjoys 
the most fundamental role in the anti-dumping proceedings under the EC anti-dumping law.  
Being the IA the Commission is also empowered with considerable discretion margin during 
the entirety of the proceedings.  
                                                 
30 Council Regulation 384/96 with amendments.  
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The Council is the relevant body to issue final trade measures (Regulations) 31, on the 
importers, found by the Commission to be in breach of the Basic Regulation. Indeed these 
measures are based on proposals from the Commission. There is a wide range of different 
trade restricting measures which can be imposed.  
In addition, the Council enjoys legal power to overrule some of the Commission’s decisions 
as e.g. imposition of provisional anti-dumping measures. However, in practice, it is evident 
that the real power of decision is overwhelmingly attributed to the Commission.  
The CFI is the legal body that shall ensure that the proceedings of the Commission and the 
following regulations issued by the Council are consistent with EC law. Private entities are 
entitled under EC law to challenge directly any regulation from the Commission or Council 
affecting their operations. The ECJ is normally the appellate body. (Van Bael & Bellis, 
2005)  
Conclusion Part I 
The comparison of Art. 82 with the ADA, shows that the two provisions lay down strikingly 
different standards when assessing and legally restricting anti-competitive behaviour. Most 
importantly, the ADA has no statement of objective and thus depends upon a de jure 
definition of dumping, which is either based on price discrimination or under cost sales. 
There is no doubt that both these practices, even when conducted simultaneously can be  part 
of  economically justifiable and rational business behaviour. The notion of unfairness must 
therefore refer to the juridical and not the economic definition. The ease of finding dumping 
in cases where the industry as a whole is suffering from a downturn is an inherent problem 
of the current Agreement from an economic perspective.   
Anti-dumping supporters main argument about dumping using cross-subsidizes from a 
sanctuary market, should be evaluated taking into account the difference between natural 
and artificial trade barriers. When artificial barriers exist alternative trade remedies should 
be considered. 
                                                 
31 Provisional measures are imposed by the Commissions.  
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Each member state’s investigating authority has considerable discretion in applying the anti-
dumping legislation. There is also a danger the IA can be politically biased in favour of 
defending national industry’s interests. Whereas the IA has considerable discretion, the 
Panels discretion is confined, parties should therefore not expect to find support in Panel 
disputes on other ground than the purely juridical.  
Considering the initial stand before the Doha negotiations there is no reason to expect any 
radical change which might make the anti-dumping agreement more economically sensible.   
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PART II 
4 Introduction to the case of Norwegian Salmon 
The data relevant for the Norwegian salmon industry will be presented here32. Seafood is 
Norway’s second most important export article33. The value of salmon and trout exports in 
2006 is estimated to NOK 16.8 billion, constituting about 45 % of the total value of seafood 
exports (EFF, 2007).34
4.1 Salmon trade disputes 
The salmon dispute has been ongoing more or less uninterruptedly for two decades. As 
salmon is a particularly important export article for Norway, the salmon case has been high 
on political agendas. There is no doubt that the salmon case would have been resolved with a 
Norwegian EU membership. While Norway’s EU membership still waits, the case could be 
used as a coercion tactic for other political matters. 
The Scottish farmers have lobbied their case well, and have also filed complaints against 
other countries such as Chile and the Faroe Islands35. Additionally, there has been separate 
disputes regarding dumping of trout36. There is a clear connection between downturn’s in 
salmon cycles and allegations of dumping from Scottish farmers, indicating their continuous 
need for protection during downturns. The cyclicality of the industry makes it especially 
vulnerable to different trade interventions. (Asche et al. 2005).  
YEAR The chronology of the Salmon case
1989 First dumping allegations from Scottish salmon producers. 
1990-2 Anti-dumping duty of 11,32 % proposed, but suspended due to a governmental programme to 
reduce exports (freezing). Minimum import price (MIP) is put in place. 
1997 The Commission imposes anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties.  
1997-2002 The “salmon agreement”. Export duty of 3 % and MIP of  € 2,9  
2003 The “salmon agreement” suspended, only minor restrictions on trade. 
                                                 
32 Note that data are subject to some uncertainty, due to different standards of reporting, misstatements etc, and that 
aggregate presentation level out nuances in the information. The salmon industry has been suspected of manipulating sales 
data (Asche et al.). 
33 Oil & Gas is the most important export sector 
34 Some data are aggregate for salmon and trout. The share of trout is 10 %.
35 Council Regulation (EC) No 930/2003 
36 Council Regulation (EC) No 437/2004 
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2004 Safeguard initiations and safeguard actions (quotas) 
2005 Safeguard measures replaced by anti-dumping duties varying from 6,8 - 25,4 % 
2005- These provisional duties are revoked and replaced by MIP’s. Norway has brought the matter 
before the WTO Panel. At present the case has not been concluded  
                                                                                                 (Source: Utenriksdepartementet, 2007) 
Trade protection has been important for the Scottish salmon industry and there is no reason 
to believe they will abandon their successful protection strategy. The outcome of the WTO 
salmon case could be decisive in this respect, and might force the EU politicians to withdraw 
their Scot support.  
4.2 The farmed salmon business 
The salmon sector has some distinctive dynamics which should be properly understood in 
order to asses the anti-dumping case. These dynamics will be presented next.  
 
(Source: Fiskeridirektoratet, 2005) 
Figure 2: Average COP/kg and operating margin for salmon (and trout).         
As can be seen from figure 2;  
 I) The average COP has been subject to a steady and considerable decrease, resulting from 
increased efficiency. Employment in the salmon business has also declined in connection 
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with to continuous structural changes37. 
II) The salmon business has profitability cycles of approximately six years, as indicated by 
the circled troughs in figure 2.  This corresponds to two production cycles of salmon. The 
down-turns and cost rationalization pressure has resulted in several shakeouts, putting non-
competitive firms out of business. Note that the decrease in production cost during 
downturns, as the one experienced in 1990-1992 and 2001-2004, is flatter or even negative. 
There also appears to be higher volatility of returns with increasing volume, which implies 
incremental risk.     
 
                                                                                                                  (Source: EFF, 2007) 
Figure 3: Production volume of farmed Norwegian salmon.  
III) Massive, and steady increase in salmon production during the last 20-25 years, helping 
Norway keeping its position as the world’s largest farmed salmon. 
4.3 International salmon markets 
The domestic consumption of farmed salmon in Norway was only 12.000 tons in 2004, or 
about 2,5 % of the total production. The rest of the production was exported (EFF, 2007). 
Thus, the Norwegian salmon industry is highly export oriented. Internationally, Norway  had 
a 43 % market share in 2006. Chile’s global share has been rising sharply the last decade, 
and was 34 % in 2006. Together, the salmon giants, Norway and Chile, produced 77 % of 
the world’s total volume of farmed salmon. 
                                                 
37 Detailed figures can be found in Appendix IV 
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4.3.1 EU Salmon market and prices 
In 2004 Norway sold 74 % of its salmon volume to the EU market (Fiskeridirektoratet, 
2005). Norway’s share of the total EU market was 60 % in 2004, up from 55 % in 2001 
(Lorentzen, 2006). Obviously, the EU is the core market for Norwegian salmon. The size of 
the EU market and the volume of imports of the product concerned are given in the 
appendixes. 
Chile still only has a minor market share of frozen salmon in the EU, 4 % in 2004, but is 
currently expanding its volumes considerably. Norway’s main competitor in the EU is Great 
Britain (Scotland), with 10 % of the total production of about 170.000 tons in 200438. As the 
Scottish salmon has a considerable EU home market, export volumes are small39. 
Consequently, there is fierce competition between Scottish and Norwegian producers in the 
EU market, with Norway as market leader. The Scottish share of the EU market was 28 % in 
2004, down from 33 % in 2003 (Lorentzen, 2006). The general trend in relative market 
shares between Norway and Scotland since 1990 has been a loss of market share from 
Norway to Scotland, from 1990 - 2000. Norway lost 10 % to Scotland, but recouped 5 % in 
the next period (including the Investigation Period - IP). 40   
4.3.2 Salmon prices 
Salmon prices are very volatile both in the short and in the long run. This relates strongly to 
the cyclicality of the sector, and the nature of salmon as a perishable product. There is also 
some seasonal variability. Norwegian producers refer to the prices as being set 
internationally, with little room for individual pricing, thus firms are chiefly price takers. 
Thus, the salmon is either sold on the spot market or on short contracts. They also hold that 
short term raw material price fluctuation do not affect the export price. Atlantic farmed 
salmon is mainly sold whole and this is perceived largely as a relatively homogeneous 
product (USITC, 2006). The existence of a salmon exchange for financial contracts supports 
this assertion41.  
                                                 
38 Calculated with data from Council Regulation (EC) 85/2006 and figures of Norwegian market share in EU. 
39 About 2 %, according to Council regulation (EC) 85/2006 using figures of non-sampled CI. 
40 Salmon volumes which some calculations are base don are given in Appendix III.  
41 Fish Pool, www.fishpool.eu 
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The Scottish salmon has a price premium in the EU of 12 %, and has obtained the French 
quality distinction “Lable rouge” (NOR1). This is relevant for the relative prices between 
Norwegian and Scotch salmon as Norway is alleged of undercutting prices. 
Price data on exported Norwegian salmon in the long, intermediate and short run, is shown 
in the next figures. From figure 4 it is clear that the price on fresh salmon hit a low point in 
the EC during the summer of 2003. This corresponds with start of the anti-dumping period 
of investigation.   
 
  
                                                                            (Source: SSB, 2005, in Lorentzen)                                               
Figure 4: Export NOK/KG, 2005-value, farmed Norwegian salmon to EU  
 
Figure 4 shows the general trend in salmon price from 1990, in 2005-values. It is clear that 
the real price has dropped sharply in this 15-year period, but with considerable fluctuation 
around the downwards trend.
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      (Source: Globefish/ERP, 2006) 
Figure 5: Export NOK/KG, farmed Nor-HOG salmon to EU  
 
In the intermediate run there was a period before the summer 2003, where prices where quite 
stable, most likely due to the salmon agreement. When the salmon agreement was 
abandoned it resulted in a further fall in the price (Finansdepartementet, 2007 and Lorentzen, 
2006).  
The low prices in this period made farmers put low quantities of smolt in the sea, which led 
to high prices two to three years later, as can be seen from figure 5 The salmon price is 
currently dropping again, owing to the considerable amounts of smolt put in the sea in 2005-
2006, the price is now touching the MIP floor of € 2,842.              
 
                                                                                                    (Source: SSB, 2007) 
                                                 
42 Week 23, 2007 price fresh salmon/kg NOK 25,83 (SSB.no) 
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Figure 6: Export NOK/KG during POI, frozen and fresh (upper) 
The last figure shows the price development during the IP. The price on frozen fish was 
above the fresh prices during almost the entire period. The price data is given on a weekly 
basis, which if shown in even more detail, would also reveal considerable intra week-
volatility.    
As can bee seen from the aggregated graph, frozen and fresh prices do not differ 
substantially. The quantities exported are about ¾ fresh, whole salmon and 15 % frozen 
salmon. The last 15 % are fresh fillet, smoked salmon etc. Thus, the price of whole fresh 
salmon as expressed by the lower curve is the most important for the anti-dumping case. 
The increase of imports per annum of Norwegian exports and the total export volumes are 
given under. Note the 20 % increase in volumes exported from 2002-2003 which coincides 
with the bottom of a downturn. This confirms the expected correlation between export 
volumes and prices. As can be seen from the figure the trends show augmenting volume 
growth contributing to the slump experienced around the IP and vice versa.   
   
                                                                                       (Source: ssb.no, 2007)  
Figure 7: Trends in export volumes 
  
According to Lorentzen (2006) paper on salmon prices in the EU, in addition to the 
Commissions dumping hypothesis, there are four complementary hypotheses concerning 
salmon price formation.  
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I) Innovation and productivity hypothesis: The annual decline in production costs is 
on average 7,2 %, this production cost decline explains 90 % of the fall in salmon 
prices in the long run. Furthermore, the strong competition makes the prices 
converge with the COP. Even though production cost data are not available from 
the Scottish farmers, there is little doubt that the efficiency pressure is 
considerable and that firms who are not able to follow the downwards spiral will 
soon become unprofitable. The supply side is thus the most influential for the 
price of salmon. The analysis also shows that the effect on salmon prices that the 
prices of salmon are affected by what happens with the COP two years in 
advance. Lorentzen further states: “In a situation where a branch is alleged of 
dumping it is especially important that there is consistency between the 
methodology used to calculate costs and prices” (p. 28).  
II) Market hypothesis: The EU market has increasing supply from various salmon 
producing countries, also contributing to the lowering of prices through the 
supply side, assuming demand is stable and not infinitely elastic.  
III) Instability hypothesis: As salmon is a source of proteins, many substitutes exist 
as e.g. other fish types and white meat. There is little doubt that the development 
of these industries affects salmon demand. As the salmon market is chiefly a spot 
market short run instability in demand can create considerable price fluctuations, 
and sales at a loss.  
IV) Business policy: The salmon market is subject to a number of explicit and 
implicit trade restrictions, and other distorting aspects of political nature, 
affecting the natural price formation. The unexpected closure of the important 
Russian salmon market in 2005 is an example of a situation event which affects 
prices in other markets. 
In 1998, using the representative French salmon market, and applying a dynamic 
reformulation of the Lau-Bresnahan model, in an error correcting framework. Steen and 
Salvanes found that the salmon market is competitive in the long run, but that the largest 
producing nation, Norway, has some market power in the short run. The short-run market 
power is linked to the seasonal migrations in wild salmon fisheries, where the market power 
is low when cheaper substitutes are available. Outside the volatile wild salmon harvest 
    
29
season, Norway aggregately has some market power. Norway’s market share in the fast 
growing European salmon market has had a decline since 1990, so there is no reason to 
suggest that the market power has increased significantly. The study of Steen (1995)43, 
further suggest one integrated European salmon market.  
4.3.3 Market structure and competition 
The Herfindahl Hirchman index (HHI), is a measure of industry concentration. In Vassdal 
(2002) the figure for the Norwegian salmon industry is very low at 0,02 for 2002. The EC 
anti-dumping case involves 102 salmon companies, showing the considerable fragmentation 
of the industry (EU1). Norwegian salmon industry has been subject to strong consolidation 
the last years. But, concentration at least in 2003-2004, seem to have been well under the 0,1 
US anti-trust threshold, between low concentration and moderate concentration.  
As Norway holds a 60 % market share and the Scotland an additional 28 %, the HHI on a 
nation’s level in the EU was high, with 0,45 in 2004. This exceeds the set threshold for a 
strongly concentrated industry. Consequently, at an aggregate national level the HHI is high, 
but low at the private entity level. The trends are, however, opposite with an increase in the 
competition between different salmon producing nations, and at the same time consolidation 
at the firm level (Lorentzen, 2006).  
An empirical study by Hyun (1998) of the U.S market based on industry concentrations 
revealed that in over 90 % of the anti-dumping cases a predatory motive could not be 
identified. The conclusion was then drawn that the anti-dumping measures imposed were 
chiefly motivated by protectionist motives. Taking into account the current degree of 
fragmentation in the salmon market and among the Norwegian exporters, it does not seem 
unreasonable to draw a similar conclusion in this case.   
 
                                                 
43 In Steen 1998. 
 30
4.3.3.1 Cyclical markets and cobweb dynamics  
The cyclicality of the salmon industry has many similarities with other agriculral industries. 
The hog/cattle - cycles are well-known from the US. Teory on these volatilities is called 
cobweb, and relates to the rational behavior of individual firms in a fragmented industry 
where each individual producer cannot affect market price. One would expect firms to learn 
from previous downturns, in practice, the number of smolt put in the sea somewhat 
correlates with the market price at the moment (Heyes & Smith, 1987). This price is taken as 
an estimate of price at harvest. The plunge in price in 2002-2004 owed to excess quantities 
of smolt put in the sea during the upturn around 2000. The new upturn in 2005-2006 is 
expected to give a similar fall in prices in 2007-2008, as the positivism has made producer’s 
put great quantities of salmon in the sea, again. Thus, the cyclicality of the industry is 
strongly related to production decissions wich are made approximately two years before 
harvest. Nevertheless, many other factors also apply such as diseases, meteorological 
conditions etc. (Asche et al., 2005) 
4.4 The salmon value chain 
The value chain of Norwegian salmon is especially lengthy and complex. The complexity is 
increased by the number of legal organizations, and the fact that the product is sold in a large 
number of different varieties (PNC’s).  
In order to properly understand the mechanisms governing the assessment and allocation of 
costs in the COP calculations of salmon, it is necessary to understand the value chain of the 
salmon production and the life cycle of the salmon. How companies are legally organized 
varies considerably, from highly specialized to fully integrated.  
As can be seen from figure 8, the production value chain can be divided into four main steps. 
The number of product variants increases exponentially by each step. 
 
Figure 8: Value chain of salmon production 
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Step one is the production of smolt, from the fertilization of the egg to the smolt is ready to 
be put in sea cages. At farming the harvestable salmon is already subject to a variety of sub-
products dependent on weight and qualities, 9 - 16 variants are normal at this stage. The 
growth of salmon is not linear, and is slowest at the start and at the end of the life-cycle. 
Farming is the core business activity. Salmons are grown in the sea, in big cages with 
thousands of salmon swimming together. In each cage the salmons are quite homogeneous 
as they are given the same feed and are subject to the same natural conditions. As they are 
put in the sea at the same time they belong to one salmon generation and will be harvested 
within a harvesting window of a few months.  
 
Figure 9: Salmon generations  
The figure shows the concept of overlapping generations. When one generation has been 
harvested, a new one will more or less immediately be put in the sea. Salmons can be grown 
all year long and there is no particular harvest season. Consequently, salmon is harvested 
several times a year providing a continuous supply of fresh salmon to the markets. 
The quality of the salmon depends on several factors such as fitness, skin, meat colour etc. 
These quality categorizations can to a certain degree be done before slaughter, but will often 
be part of the slaughter process, as some quality differences are not visible until the fish is 
gutted. Most of the salmon will fall within the superior quality category, while the fish with 
major or minor flaws, are categorized as either ordinary or production fish. These are 
normally sold at a lower market price. Norway does not sell production fish to the EU. At 
the fourth and last stage, the fish is further processed into different cuts of salmon or into 
smoked, fillet, canned etc. Freezing can happen at every stage after slaughter. 
The base product is technically called whole fish equivalent (WFE), and is the starting point 
for all further variants of processing. The WFE is a fish which is starved and bled, reducing 
the weight to the upper of 90 % of a live salmon. The WFE is an important concept as all 
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other cuts and variants are calculated as a standard percentage of the WFE. There are both 
standard industry conversion coefficients and firm specific ones.  
The transition between the production value chain and the distribution chain is not clear cut. 
The distribution chain is essential as dumping cannot exist before the salmon crosses the EU 
border. Also the distribution chain is characterized by a number of different legal 
arrangements. Firstly, there is a distinction between salmon production and exporting which 
is particularly prominent in the organization of the Norwegian industry. Secondly, many 
Norwegian salmon companies have ownership interests in the EC both among importers and 
processors (NOR1). Therefore, the product is not necessarily completely processed at the 
time of export, as the EC has a considerable processing industry using whole Norwegian 
salmon as their intermediate input. The production value chain can also end with domestic 
sales to related or non-related exporters. 
 
Figure 10: Value chain of Norwegian Salmon production 
The time from slaughter to consumption is very short for fresh salmon taking into account 
the lengthiness of the production value chain. According to USITC (2006), the shelf time for 
chilled (not frozen) salmon is 10-14 days. Thus, if not frozen or otherwise preserved, salmon 
is a highly perishable product.  
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4.4.1 Production time & timing 
A decision to start hatching smolt must also be done 15 to 18 months before the smolt is put 
in sea water. If there has been hatched to many smolt, the fry might need to be destructed. 
This adds costs to the remaining smolt of that generation. The smolt is put in the sea at time 
X and can be harvested at Y-Y1. During the growing period, which takes 15-18 months 
depending on water temperature, the producer cannot stop feeding the salmon. The only 
alternative if markets appear to be depressed is to slaughter the fish at a premature stage. 
Premature salmon weighing less than 1 kg have no market, furthermore fish of less than 2 kg 
have higher slaughter costs as the fish does not fit into the gutting machines and less fish is 
processed for each man hour. The optimal harvest weight is normally 4-6 kg and the average 
harvesting weight is over 4 kg/gutted. At a certain age, about 3-4 years, the salmon gets 
mature and must be used for row production.  
Even though the farmer has a certain time window in which to harvest the salmon it is quite 
evident that once the smolt is put in the sea, considerable resources are compromised. The 
basic nature of the salmon market implies that the cost of discontinuation when the smolt is 
in the sea is higher than carrying through with the production process.  
Clearly the farmer has no rational alternative but to bring the salmon to the market at any 
price the market will offer at the time of harvesting. At this stage the only choice is then 
when within the harvesting window the farmer decides to slaughter the salmon. There is also 
a possibility to freeze the fish and wait for higher prices.44  
When the salmon is decided to be sold fresh the flexibility is low, if no contract exist the 
merchandize is subject to the volatile spot market of fresh salmon. At the end of the day the 
producer can be forced to accept any price payable to avoid the fresh salmon being spoilt.  
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5 Anti-dumping proceedings 
Anti-dumping investigations in the EC are initiated by the Commission on behalf of a 
complaining industry. Central to the dumping determination is the establishment of a normal 
value and an export price. These are compared in order to determine a dumping margin. 
Injury determination is also central, but not a special focus in this thesis. Additional 
procedural aspects will also be presented for the overall comprehension of anti-dumping 
proceedings45.   
5.1 Procedures 
This section will briefly address how the proceedings are carried out by the EC institutions. 
The important role of the Commission as the central IA, will be further enlightened.  
Brief overview of the relevant procedural aspects to be presented. 
The dumping practice must be injurious, section 5.2. A complaint must be filed by the 
Community Industry (CI) in section 5.2.1 and the injury cased must be linked to the dumped 
exports section 5.2.2. The complaint must have support, and the interest of the Community 
as a whole shall be taken into account section 5.2.3. There must be dumped product, section 
5.2.4. The dumping must have happen during a certain period, section 5.2.5. When the 
exporting industry is extensive there must be created a representative sample section 5.2.6. 
The charged industry must provide evidence, section 5.2.7.  
5.2 Determination of injury  
Even though the injury analysis is central in any anti-dumping investigation and highlighted 
both in the salmon case and in the anti-dumping literature, it is outside the scope of this 
thesis to include a full coverage of the different aspects of injury determinations. Still, as to 
provide the reader with the full picture, some central aspects relevant to the injury 
determination and the rest of the proceeding are presented next. 
Norwegian salmon farmers should note that the most effective defence in anti-dumping 
cases is based on the injury analysis. (Stevenson 2006)  
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5.2.1 Community industry  
The definition of the Community industry (CI) is important and states as:  
I) the industry must agree on filing the case with a minimum of 25 % support 
and46;  
II) the industry is central to determine injury.   
The CI, for this purpose, includes the producers of the “like product”. The EU farming of 
salmon chiefly takes place in Scotland. An interesting feature is that the Commissions 
definition of industry does not include all producers. The most central criteria relevant to the 
EC salmon case is that the CI must be independent of the Norwegian industry. (Andersen, 
2006) As Norwegian firms have broad ownership interests in the EC industry, this excluded 
a considerable share of the producers in the determination of the CI. The 25 % support 
threshold was consequently applied to a small fraction of the total community industry. The 
support finally amounted approximately 12 % of EU farming production47. The relevant CI 
employs only 221 persons48 and is therefore a minor branch of the total EC salmon industry, 
taking into account the considerable processing industry employing several thousands on the 
continent49.  
5.2.2 Injury and a causal link 
A fundamental prerequisite for dumping findings is injury to the CI and the establishment of 
a causal link. The sample for determination of injury constituted five producers with a total 
production in the IP of 9.000 tons. The figures used by the Commission for the injury 
assessments are given next, for the period between 2001 and the IP (the period concerned): 
I)  The community industry (injury):  The production of the CI increased with 17 % while 
the capacity utilization fell with 4 %. The market share was stable around 3.3 %. The prices 
received fell by 6 % and the profitability on CI sales fell from 7.2 % to - 4 %, while the ROI 
fell from 36.7 % to - 21.4 %. However, investments in IP were approx. the double of those in 
                                                                                                                                                      
45 A schematic overview is given in appendix IV 
46 If less than 50 % support, the share opposing the complaint must be lower than the share supporting in order for it to 
pass.  
47 Calculated with data from Commission Regulation  (EC) 826/2 006 and figures of Norwegian market share in EU.  
48 Council Regulation 85/2006 
49 No exact figure available, but considerable processing industry in Demark and many other EU countries.  
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2001, showing ability to raise capital. Productivity went slightly up, while labor costs fell 
with 19 %. (ibid)50  
II) The Norwegian exports were also examined (link): A volume increase of 35 % was 
found, compared to a community increase in consumption of 15 %. Consequently, Norway’s 
market share increased with 17 %, from 50 to 60 %. While prices fell simultaneously with 
16 % (averaging 2.61 €/kg). 
Taking account of all of these factors, the provisional conclusion reached is that the 
Community industry has suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3 of the 
basic Regulation. 51  
As can be understand the Commission linked an increase in imports during a slump with 
poor performance (injury) of the CI in the same period. The Commission did not hesitate to 
conclude that the injury requirement of the Basic Regulation was fulfilled. The wording in 
the Regulation appears to be biased in favor of finding injury and contradicting evidence is 
largely neglected.  No consideration of the cyclical nature of the business is mentioned. 
(ibid)  
The Commission firmly rebutted the objection that Scottish firms were less efficient and 
stated that both industries had some cost advantages and that “Overall, it is noted that whilst 
the Community producers are incurring significant losses in the current market, so too are 
Norwegian producers”. 52 The additional export and transport cost of Norwegian producers, 
the 3.05 % export and imports duty (EFF, 2007), and the 12 % premium enjoyed by Scottish 
producers were apparently not included in that reasoning.  
 
The imports of 118.000 tons of salmon from third countries at an average prices of € 2.23 
(38 cent below Norway’s price) 53, were not considered to affect the CI performance, 
because wild salmon did not affect the CI (read: EU market/prices). This last assumption can 
be rebutted by Steen et Salvanes (1997) Even though not defined within the like product 
definition, wild and farmed salmon are close substitutes for consumers. Supply of wild 
                                                 
50 Commission Regulation (EC) 628/2006 
51 Commission Regulation (EC) 628/2005 at recital 89. 
52 Commission Regulation (EC) 628/2005 at recital 108 
53 Includes wild salmon. Chile was the only country above Norwegian level. The explanation might be that the prices for 
frozen salmon at the moment were higher, at least frozen from Norway was indeed (table xx). 
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salmon is seasonable, very volatile and can be supplied at low prices54. Neglecting the wild 
salmon’s effect on the market price for farmed salmon is gibberish. 
 
The view that the Commission made a too superficial injury and link assessment can be 
supported by the price formation hypothesis suggested by Lorentzen (2006). Even though 
Norwegian imports might have had an impact on prices and Scottish farmer’s results there is 
undoubtedly more to this issue than the Commission states in its Regulation 628/200655.  
5.2.2.1 Injury margin 
The injury margin is established as the effect of the dumped goods on the price received by 
the CI. The difference between the non-injurious price and the dumped price is called price 
underselling. The size of the injury margin is important for the level of the final anti-
dumping duty (Stevenson, 2005). This will be revisited.  
 
5.2.3 Community interests 
The Basic Regulation contains a stakeholder clause in Art. 21, where it states that: “A 
determination as to whether the Community interest calls for intervention shall be based on 
an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole…” There is no analogue 
provision to this in the ADA. 
 
This provision has apparently played a trivial role in the Commissions investigation and has 
been a source of conflict between the Scottish farmers and the interests of other important 
groups, most notably among them the EC processing industry.  
In an evaluation of EC trade defence instruments by Stevenson (2005), a general point raised 
by some anti-dumping opponent respondents was the bias towards finding that that measures 
are in the Community’s interest. Supporting this view is a very limited number of published 
terminations on the grounds of Community interest.        
The Commission base their lack of dismissals on theoretical implications saying that price 
volatility might go down and possibly a more stable supply could be ensured. However, this 
                                                 
54 Commission Regulation, 628/2005 at recital 94 
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is a weak argument as it only affects the volatility providing low prices, which are beneficial 
for both processing industry and consumers56.  
There is thus little evidence to refuse the argument that a small group of Scottish farmers 
receive protection with other groups within the EC paying the price. Even though this can 
seem unreasonable, it is at the Commissions full discretion to evaluate internal effects. A 
rather simplistic argument from the Commission is that since complaints from consumer’s 
(organizations) are few, there is no serious threat to their interests (Stevenson, 2005). If they 
find that the cost of fighting the allegedly unfair trade practice is worth the losses incurred 
upon other community groups, there is little Norwegians can do apart from convincing the 
EU’s unprivileged groups to lobby their case. “Given the importance of lobbying, it is 
essential that interested parties engage in it as appropriate. However, as highlighted 
elsewhere, it is not easy for a company – particularly an SME – to identify the appropriate 
officials in each Member State to whom they might speak”. (Ibid, p 33). 
Asche et al. (2005) estimated that the EC consumer’s loss of welfare, due to the recent 
salmon case amounted to a minimum of MNOK 1000. The additional costs of the proceeding 
and other parties add to this staggering sum. The Commission has expressed little concern 
for this as they find that the loss is pulverized among the mass of consumers and 
consequently be trifling at the individual level.57  
5.2.4 The like product and product concerned 
The definition of what constitutes the product under investigation, and the like product58, is 
essential for the anti-dumping proceedings, especially the determination of injury and might 
have a different meaning between them. The product under investigation is the product 
exported. The product under investigation is also analogous to the product concerned. The 
like product is a product which is identical to or closely resembles the product concerned. 
(EU1).  
 
A single investigation will normally include various sub-products each of them just 
                                                 
56 Council regulation 628/2005 at recital 130 
57 Commission Regulation (EC) 628/2005. 
58 ADA Art. 2.6, gives the definition, the provision  also uses the French term “Producit similaire”.  
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marginally different from the other. In the salmon case we have salmon in different 
presentations e.g. fillet, HOG, but also of different qualities as superior and ordinary.  
 
“Four criteria were taken into account: (1) three qualities of fish: superior, ordinary, 
or low; (2) whether it was fresh/chilled, or frozen, (3) eight successive stages in the 
processing of the fish from whole fish to fillet, (4) seven different sizes of fish (in the 
case of whole fish). In theory the different combinations of these criteria could lead 
to a great number of PCN, but the number that arises in practice is more limited”. 
(EU4 at recital 69) 
 
In the salmon case the product under investigation and the like product are the same “farmed 
(other than wild) salmon, whether or not filleted, fresh, chilled or frozen”59, however, non-
exported models will fall outside the product under investigation. Exported salmon products 
outside the definition include e.g. smoked salmon and canned salmon.  
 
As in domestic competition law, product definitions are fundamental for the scope of the 
anti-dumping cases, and have great relevance for the proceedings and their outcome. The 
vague wording of the legal provisions and the considerable case-by-case assessment often 
make the definitions subject to great disagreement. Consequently, these definitions have 
played an important and controversial role, both in the Commission proceedings, and in the 
current WTO Salmon case.  
5.2.5 Period of investigation 
In order to determine if salmon has been dumped an investigation period (IP/POI) is 
established. According to Czako (2003, p.36) “The period of investigation (POI) is therefore 
the period for which data to be used in the (dumping) investigation are collected by the 
investigating authorities”. 
 
The POI is normally one year, but shall never be less than six months, one year is the 
standard length. The POI should end as close as possible to the initiation of the proceedings. 
(Czako, 2003). The POI in the Salmon case was chosen by the Commission to be from 1 
October 2003 to 30 September 2004. The period for determining injury is normally longer. 
The Commission chose a period from 1 January 2001 to 30 September 2004 as the period for 
                                                 
59 Council Regulation (EC) 85/2006 
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injury assessment (period concerned).  
 
5.2.6 Sampling 
In some investigations there are considerable fragmentation in either, or both, the CI and the 
exporting industry. Even though anti-dumping investigations are performed on a business to 
business basis highly fragmented branches constitutes a challenge when it comes to the 
administrative capacity of the IA. 
As a consequence the practice of sampling is now implemented in the ADA Art. 6.10. 
Regarding the sampling of exporters or (CI) the IA must choose a representative sample in 
order to establish dumping margins (injury). The sampled companies should normally 
include the largest exporters.  
In the salmon case ten exporters representing 37.2 % of the Norwegian exports to the EC, 
where chosen to represent the industry (NOR1). Companies which did accept to form part of 
the sample, but was still excluded, were automatically given the average of the dumping 
margins of the sample. The highest dumping margin found in the sample was given to all 
companies who did not to cooperate with the IA.  
The EC sample excluded all Norwegian traders from the sample. The Norwegian authorities 
have contested the exclusion of this part of the industry as the independent exporters have 
unique cost structures and trade great volumes (NOR1). This is not unique; IA’s do not 
calculate individual dumping margins for traders, who are given the highest of the sample 
(residual margin). The reason is that traders can easily shift their source of supply (Vermulst, 
2005). 
It is obvious that the sampling practice can provide considerable injustice to many parties: 
 I) The producers who are involuntarily excluded from the sample and therefore given the 
average dumping-margin, when no dumping for that company has factually been observed, 
and the company has tried to cooperate.  
II) The effect can be especially punitive for trading companies as they are treated as de facto 
non-cooperating, while they might be fully co-operative.  (Van Bael & Bellis, 2004)   
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5.2.7 Facts available and company information 
The parties involved in the proceeding will get different questionnaires from the 
Commission with strict deadlines. The Basic Regulation states in Art 18 (1), that companies 
refusing access to, or otherwise do not provide necessary information within time, or 
supplies false or misleading information, can be subject to the use of “facts available”. 
This point is relevant for all companies forming part of an investigation. Basically, when the 
Commission resorts to facts available the company concerned will be disadvantaged as a 
punishment for not providing the right information in the right manner. Companies should 
make every effort necessary to avoid the application of facts available.  
Another important provision is ADA Art. 6.2: “Throughout the anti-dumping investigations 
all interested parties shall have a full opportunity to defend their interests”.  Accordingly, 
individual firms have a right to get their opinion taken into account. Companies should use 
this opportunity as they cannot expect the Commission to base its rulings on other 
information than the one provided and properly justified.  
5.3 Determination of dumping  
Dumping determination consists of two fundamental elements.  
I) The establishment of an export price (EXP) and; 
II) the establishment of a normal value (NV).   
Chiefly, if the NV exceeds the EXP, there is evidence of price discrimination between the 
two national markets, the basic condition for dumping in international cases.   
5.3.1 Export price 
The EXP is normally easier to establish, as exports should be well documented transactions 
(Vermulst, 2005). The relevant price is the price to the first independent customer. 
Transaction costs will be deducted in order to arrive at an ex factory price.  
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                                                                                           (Source: Stevenson, 2005) 
Figure 11: Export price
When the exporter and importer are related parties or compensatory agreements exist, the ex 
factory price is constructed from the price to the first independent customer, deducting 
importers additional costs, or on any reasonable basis60.  
5.4 Normal value 
The normal value (NV) is the value to be compared with the export price in order to 
determine the potential existence of dumping. Normal value is defined in ADA Art. 2.1, as: 
“the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined 
for consumption in the exporting country”. 
 
NV’s are normally established, as average values of the comparable domestic sales 
transactions in the IP, for each sub-product category. The sub-product NV’s are later 
aggregated to one company or product concerned value. The NV is an art of legal 
craftsmanship, related to the economic term; domestic market price. However, the term NV 
is broader and more flexible than the domestic market, price and can apply to more complex 
business situations where domestic prices are not viable or available. (Li, 2001)  
 
In market economies NV is established using the following methods under the Basic 
Regulation61: 
                                                 
60 ADA Art 2.3 
61 Normal Value can also be established on (any)”facts available” for non-cooperating companies. Normal Value is not 
established for independent trading companies as they do not manufacture the product.   
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I)  Comparable domestic sales prices of the producer concerned62. 
Art. 2 (1):“The NV shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the 
ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country”.  
If the conditions for establishing NV under I) are not fulfilled this implies a departure 
from the preferred method. The Commission must then employ alternative II). 
 
II) Comparable domestic sales prices of other producers. 
Following implicitly from Art. 2(1), when sales under I) does not exist, NV can be 
based on prices from comparable sales of other producers/exporters. 
 
When NV cannot be properly established under I) and II), alternatives to NV methods based 
on domestic transaction must be utilized. The “departure rule” is given by ADA Art. 2.2: 
“When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic 
market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market situation or the 
low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country, such sales do not 
permit a proper comparison”.  
There are two alternative methods which do not use domestic sales transactions. The 
alternative methods, which will be described further in chapter 7 and section 6.5, are:  
III) Constructed NV (CNV)  
IV) Export prices to an appropriate third country 
5.4.1 Rules for domestic sales in NV (I & II) 
Pursuant to the “departure rule” set out above there are four cumulative conditions that must 
be fulfilled in order to determine whether domestic sales transactions are suitable to form the 
basis for NV’s63; 
I)    domestic sales must exist; 
II)   the domestic sales must be representative; 
                                                 
62 For simplicity, and consistent with this thesis’ case, the country of origin and the exporting country are the same. The 
implications when divergences from these conditions exist will not be treated here.    
63 Note lower price elasticity in the domestic market or monopoly power does not affect the suitability of domestic 
transactions to form the basis for NV and is either adjusted for at a later stage. 
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III) the sales must have been done in the ordinary course of trade; 
IV) the sales must permit a proper comparison.    
According to the “single economic unit approach”, established by the EC courts, the relevant 
price is the price charged to the first independent customer. As can be seen this is analogous 
to the establishment of the EXP (Muller et al., 1998).  
The court further held in Matsuchita II (ibid), that the producer and the sales company does 
not need to have share majority in the sales company to be treated as a single unit. This 
applies as long as the distribution company performs tasks which are “normally” part of a 
company’s internal sales department.  
Levels of trade inconsistencies and other relevant factors affecting price comparability must 
be taken into account, either when establishing the NV or before the final comparison with 
the export price. An example of this can be differences between sales to consumers or 
wholesalers64.  
5.4.1.1 The 5 per cent - low volume test  
Domestic sales are assumed to be unreliable if they amount to less than 5 % of the exports.65 
The test is applied both overall and on each of the sub-products (PNC’s). E.g. a PNC can be 
whole gutted salmon (HOG).  
The 5 % test is a benchmark66, and not an absolute test as price formations in domestic 
markets   depend on many other factors than such a test can absorb e.g. absolute volumes. 
The test is done on an exporter to exporter basis, thus in order to offer some legal certainty 
exceptions are only made under special circumstances (Müller et al 1998).This test can be 
illustrated assuming that the fictitious company Salmon Ltd. has the following sales: 
                                                 
64 ADA Art. 2.4 
65 The 5 % was introduced by the Commission in the Electrical Typewriters case (Van Bael and Bellis, 2004), and has 
consistently been applied since. The 5 % criterion was explicitly included in the ADA in 1994 in note 2 and in the Basic 
regulation Art. 2 (3) 
66 In Farmed Atlantic Salmon where the Norwegian market was found to be competitive and exporter’s domestic sales of 4 
% relative to community exports were accepted. Council Regulation (EC) No 1890/97 at recital 15. 
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Table 2: Salmon Ltd’s sales 
Product Export  
(kg/WFE) 
Domestic 
sales 
Percentage Under/over 
threshold 
Whole 1000 100 10 % Over 
HOG 500 1000 200 % Over 
Fillet 2000 50 2,5 % Under 
Total (all PNC’s) 3500 1150 33 % Over 
 
In this case the test holds for the company’s aggregate domestic sales and the sales for the 
sub products; whole and HOG. NV cannot be determined on the basis of domestic sales for 
fillet, due to the low volume of sales (2.5 %). The 5 % test can be re-applied by the IA, after 
sales not “in the ordinary course of trade” has been excluded (Czako, 2003).  
5.4.1.2 The ordinary course of trade 
Sales transactions may67 be excluded from NV calculations if they are found not to be “in 
the ordinary course of trade”. The ADA is silent on the specific conditions which must 
apply in order to deem sales to be outside the ordinary course of trade, except for sales under 
COP. The Basic Regulation, on its own account, lists one additional circumstance which can 
make sales unreliable for NV. As the Regulation is open-ended, bullet III: “other 
circumstances”, is also included68. 
I) Sales below full cost:   
Complicated and ambiguous rules apply to ascertain whether sales have been made under 
COP69. According to Lindsey & Ikeson (2002) “empirically, the cost-test is among the most 
significant causes of inflated dumping margins”. The test is governed by ADA Art. 2.2.1. 
“Sales of the like product in the domestic market of the exporting country or sales to 
a third country at prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production plus 
administrative selling and general costs may be treated as not being in the ordinary 
course of trade by reason of price and may be disregarded in determining normal 
value only if the authorities determine that such sales are made within an extended 
period of time in substantial quantities and are at prices which do not provide for the 
                                                 
67 According to Vermulst, at least for sales under cost there is no obligation to exclude these sales. Regarding sales between 
related parties the ECJ has held that the Council must exclude prices which are affected by the relationship. Case c-76/00 
par 79-93 
68 According to Vermulst, sales under cost and sales to related parties are the most common grounds for deeming sales to 
be outside the ordinary course of trade internationally. Furthermore, it should be noted that the investigating authorities 
discretion margin is considerable. 
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recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time. If prices which are below per 
unit costs at the time of sale are above weighted average per unit costs for the period 
of investigation, such prices shall be considered to provide for recovery of costs 
within a reasonable period of time”. 
  
The provision also includes several footnotes. The basic steps of this test for most practical 
purposes are given next: 
- The first step is to establish a benchmark to consider whether sales are made at a 
loss. This benchmark is the COP plus SG&A. The rules are consistent with the ones 
for CNV except for the non-inclusion of profits.  
- In order to be deemed outside the ordinary course of trade sales under cost must be 
done within an “extended period of time”. The extended period of time is given in 
Article 2 (4), being normally one year, but not less than six months. In practice this 
implies that sales under cost should be quantified relative to the IP. The concept is 
included to avoid penalizing sporadic sales made at a loss70.    
The most important rule regards the determination of what is “substantial quantities”. This 
can either imply; 
- i) the weighted average sales price in the “extended period of time” is under the full 
cost or;  
ii) the average Dprice is larger than COP, but the volume of sales under COP is more 
than 20 % of the sales being used to establish NV for each model, in the same period, 
and those sales;  
                                                 
70 According to Czako et al. the “extended period of time” test is an initial test and the “substantial quantities” a second test 
to apply if the first one is positive. In Van Bael & Bellis p. 56, Muller et al.p 78 at 2.37 and Vermulst p. 28 the concept 
does not appear to be clear. Vermulst remarks that the “substantial quantity” test in practice is often the most important, but 
uses a one month example to illustrate the whole concept ignoring eventual implications of the first test. In the doctorial 
thesis of Li, Wenxi the matter is equally unclear or confused: “Under this note, at least sales below cost for less than six 
months should be treated as being in the ordinary course of trade rather than as not being in the ordinary course of trade”. 
The author is sceptical to the “extended period of time” criteria as it appears to be rather superfluous. In his view it would 
be more intuitive and simple to just set out that the “substantial quantity” test should apply on the whole of the IP. As the 
matter stands now the tests implications are vague. The possibility of using an extract of 6 months from which to apply the 
quantity test cannot be ruled out. This hypothetical possibility, with no obvious purpose, could easily have been erased 
simplifying the legal text.      
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iii) “are at prices which do not allow for recovery of costs within a reasonable period 
of time”71. 
The “substantial quantity” concept is explained in detail through the flow-diagram under. 
Situation i) is shown in the right path situation while ii) is shown in the left:  
 
 
Figure 12: The 80/10 for ordinary course of trade 
- If average domestic sales price, Dprice is under full cost of production (COP), all 
transactions under COP will be disregarded and NV calculated on remaining sales 
when volumes not made at a loss are larger than 10 % of total sales. 
- If average domestic sales price (Dprice) is over full cost (COP), sales will only be 
disregarded as not being in the ordinary course of trade if they amount to more than 
20 % of the total sales when volumes of sales not made at a loss are larger than 10 % 
of total sales. 
                                                 
71 This relates to cases with declines of production costs during the IP e.g. due to short life cycle of the product concerned. 
As the production cost of salmon in this respect is (at least assumedly) quite stable during an IP the implications of iii) will 
not be further discussed. 
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- NV cannot be based on the transactions concerned where the 10 % threshold is not 
met. 
Table 3: Hypothetical example for Salmon Ltd. 
 
As can be seen from the examples, the existence of cyclical markets can seriously affect the 
NV. Both the existence of seasonal price fluctuations and cyclical fluctuation, can contribute 
to findings of sales under COP. This applies independently of any similar price variations 
also in the export markets.  
In situation (4), there are sales considerably under COP in November and December, which 
could be rightfully deemed outside the ordinary course of trade. This cannot be penalized in 
that situation as the sales do not constitute 20 %. In the other situations with more reasonable 
business patterns, NV is artificially inflated with 20-35 %. 
Lindsay and Ikenson (2002) constructed a similar example and showed that fictitious 
dumping margins could easily be created using this methodology and concluded: “one of the 
most egregious methodological distortions in contemporary antidumping practice is the so-
called cost test”. One might rightfully wonder how this test’s reasoning passes muster.  
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Regarding the sanctuary market discussion in section 2.3.1.1, sales under cost should be 
affirmative evidence that these conditions do not exist (Ibid). Furthermore, the test is flawed 
because it treats home sales at a loss as not in the ordinary course of trade, while exports at 
identical prices are included in the export price as dumped goods. This is clearly 
unsymmetrical. The unreasonableness of this method gets particularly extreme in industries 
selling perishable goods as in the salmon business, as there is a strong sunk cost element, 
with under COP sales being perfectly rational behaviour in many ordinary business 
situations.72
II) Sales to associated parties and parties having a compensatory agreement:  
Prices to related customers73  or between parties having a compensatory agreement may be 
considered as not being in the ordinary course of trade, if the relation between the companies 
affects prices. Prices are compared to unrelated sales to assess whether they are comparable. 
If prices examined are not consistently different from sales to unrelated parties they can be 
assumed to be in the ordinary course of trade. This could be an important issue e.g. when 
including such sales make the difference in the 5 % test. 74
III) Other circumstances: 
The following are some case law examples of other circumstances which have been 
considered outside the “ordinary course of trade” are (Czako, 2003, p.61): 
- Colour picture tubes: Second quality products. 
- Electronic weighting scales: Sample sales 
- Cotton yarn: Domestic prices fixed by government 
 
                                                 
72 Consequently the USDOC uses a more liberal benchmark on perishable goods. There is no analogous practice in the EC. 
The USDOC has found that salmon is not to be within this category, as there is a harvesting window of several months. 
(Alberta, 2000). 
73 The definition of related parties is found in Article 143 of the Community Customs Code. 
74 The USDOC has used a test which excludes sales if they are in average more than 0,5 % lower priced, than sales to 
related parties. The AB has held that these kinds of tests are within the discretion to member states to apply as long as they 
are applied even-handedly. Thus, both lower priced and higher priced sales should be likely able to be found outside the 
ordinary course of trade. On these grounds some countries consistently regard all sales between related parties as being 
outside the ordinary course of trade.  (Vermulst, 2005) 
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5.4.2 Substitutes to normal value 
This thesis deals specifically with the case when there is no, or not sufficient sales, in the 
ordinary course of trade, of the like product in the domestic market. This is often the case 
when a small country is a world leading supplier of a specific product, as is the case for 
salmon from Norway. The situation also applies to cases where a special variant of the 
product is produced exclusively for the export markets, and another variant is produced for 
domestic sales.  
If no other exporter has sufficient domestic sales, there are two substitute options left. The 
ADA and the Basic Regulation leaves the investigation authorities full discretion to choose 
among the two alternatives:75  
I) Constructed normal value (CNV):  
The CNV calculates an artificial domestic price based on COP, SG&A and a 
reasonable amount for profits, as if the product had been sold on the domestic 
market. 
II) Prices to third countries: 
This alternative utilizes the EXP price from any appropriate third country, as NV.   
However, the Commission has repeatedly shown reluctance to apply alternative II) as 
allegedly “there is no way to exclude the possibility that the product is also dumped in other 
foreign markets”76. (Li, 2003 p.89)  
The only country using third country EXP as a substitute for NV is the US. However, 
according to Vermulst (2005, p 33): “As the very definition of dumping depends in part on 
the price of the third country exports, one may wonder whether such (the Commission’s) 
simplistic reasoning passes muster”. (parenthesis added).  
 
                                                 
75 ADA Art. 2.2.1 
76 Ferro-silicone case. 
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CNV calculations are often controversial because the ADA gives IA wide discretion 
regarding how to calculate and allocate costs. As the IA view often differs from the 
companies concerned, CNV issues are often argued fiercely77. 
5.5 Discussion on CNV vs. third country export prices 
It would be awkward if policy makers did implement an alternative with no practical use, 
therefore it is interesting to assess whether the Commission’s reasoning holds.78 There is no 
literature known to the author treating this alternative methods usefulness.  
As Vermulst (2005) indicates without further evaluating his argument, one common 
assumptions of international dumping is subsidizations from a protected home market. In 
case there is no significant home market there can be no such cross-subsidizing. The only 
viable option in order to cross-subsidize in this case is to use profits from other export 
markets, a sanctuary third country market. An alternative is to subsidize dumping practice by 
using shareholders equity. The reasonableness of this logic should be evaluated in each 
particular case.    
Moving to a hypothetical salmon case with no competition from other countries, cross-
subsidising from a sanctuary export market could be a way to subsidize predatory pricing in 
absence of a significant domestic market. To investigate this possibility, seems more 
reasonable than assuming that dumping is intentionally subsidised through incurring losses 
in the home market, and in all other markets, to avoid dumping allegations based on price 
discrimination.   
In this hypothetical case dumping could then be detected by comparing EXP to the EU79 
with EXP to e.g. Japan or Russia. If prices are higher in third markets this would indicate 
price discrimination. This could provide an explanation to where the sanctuary market 
subsidizing the dumping activities actually is. Why other producing countries should not 
                                                 
77 WTO Salmon case 
78 EC reasoning: Ferro-silicon (Iceland, Norway, Sweden etc) and Large rainbow trout (Norway, Faroe Islands) in Van 
Bael and Bellis (2004) 
79 To arrive at this there is a presumption that the costs of serving the markets are similar, implying that the NV and export 
price must be comparable. This presumption makes sense as anti-dumping depends upon the pricing behaviour of the 
company. If price differences are not a result of the pricing behaviour but market specific cost factors these should be 
adjusted for in the comparability process 
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take part in the premiums earned in this market could be an additional question. If the 
reasons were specific trade-barriers put upon the Scottish salmon providers, one could start 
seeing the outline of a “real” anti-dumping case. If not, price discrimination could be found 
as a consequence of different competitive pressures, a normal and reasonable explanation. 
In case prices are under COP in all significant export markets as assumed by the 
Commission, and there is no significant home market, can firms be behaving in an unfair 
manner? 
I) Predatory pricing: Only possible when taking on heavy equity losses in all   
significant markets.  
II) Price discrimination: Not possible, as the same “dumped” price exist in all 
markets. However, as IA understand it can be created artificially by using 
CNV. 
If there is “dumping” in all markets there should be no price discrimination and with no 
market to subsidize from, this kind of predatory pricing will in most cases be unreasonably 
costly, and is consequently just a theoretical notion. Overall low prices are therefore most 
likely related to cyclical markets, not predatory behaviour.  
As mentioned only the US uses third country prices as surrogates for NV on a regular basis. 
In the Panel rapport of the US-Norway salmon case, one can verify that the US attempted to 
use the third country alternative with EU import prices: 
“After finding that substantially all (over 90 per cent) of the third country sales of seven 
of the exporters were at prices below costs of production, the Department had based 
the NV for these seven exporters on the costs of production”80. (ADP/97) 
As can be understood Norway also sold under cost in the EU market, and probably all 
salmon producers did, as the alleged dumping in that case, as in the current salmon case, did 
coincide with a general market slump. Instead of evaluating whether low third country 
export prices could imply that there might be no unfair behaviour at all, the US just restored 
to the use of CNV. The Commission normally does not even bother to check the third 
                                                 
80 For an eight exporter the normal value was actually based on third country prices. 
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country prices. However, if they actually did, one would not expect a different attitude than 
the one shown by the US81. 
The actual and relevant Norwegian FOB EXP for 2004 were: Japan $ 1.57/pound, Russia 
1.51 $/pound and the EU 1.51 $/pound (USITC, 2006). This could indicate a dumping 
margin of 4 % compared with the Japanese market. However, one would probably find that 
this was just a reasonable premium on Norwegian salmon (which might also apply to 
Scottish), and thus far from any evidence of cross-subsidization and unfair behaviour. 
Conclusions Part II 
The salmon industry and salmon markets have some distinctive characteristics, which are 
fundamental for understanding pricing behaviour. The salmon COP has been falling steadily 
for a number of years; this has affected the volumes produced and the prices. Companies 
which have not been able to keep up with this downwards spiral of industry rationalization 
have been driven out of business, as prices follow costs closely. 
Norwegian salmon has a small home-market, thus the sanctuary home market theory can be 
rejected. The most important export market is the EU where Norway has 60 % market share 
and Scotland about 30 %. Even though this concentration suggests market power, there is 
little evidence of this as firms operate largely on an independent basis. The market price is 
formed globally, and firms are price takers.  
The most significant impact on prices except from the decline of COP is related to the 
volumes harvested, even though demand factors are also significant. Individual firms will 
tend to base their production decisions on projections of future prices, which are established 
on basis of the present price level. As there is a considerable lag between the decision to 
appropriate resources and the sales, volume setting might not be optimal, creating cyclic 
patterns. Furthermore, as salmon to a great extent is a perishable product and its production 
can not be set on hold, sunk cost implications are important as at harvest time the farmer 
might need to accept any price.  
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In relation to the formal proceedings, firms should be particularly attentive to the 
Commissions possibility to resort to facts available. Firms should also be aware of their 
explicit right of being allowed to present their view and defend themselves against 
allegations. In addition firms should recognize the importance of lobbying the case both 
directly to decision makers, but also to other interest groups in the EC.  
The sampling technique is justifiable from a practical perspective but is undoubtedly unfair 
at the individual level, especially when firms are involuntary excluded from the sample. The 
randomness of using averages on non-sampled companies is unquestionable.   
The injury determination is one of the few areas where anti-dumping cases might be 
successfully challenged. In order to avoid the Commission being able to draw simplistic 
conclusions, the provision of documentation is essential. The Commission will only take into 
account information which it has received from interested parties, and will draw its 
conclusions on that basis. The Norwegian industry must therefore make sure that the 
Commission is submitted all necessary documentation which might support their case.  
Several of the industry related factors contribute to the considerable volatility of salmon 
prices, both in the short and the long run. The dynamics of the salmon market is also 
common for other agricultural markets. In these markets the existence of sales transactions 
and shorter periods with sales under COP is perceived as normal and justifiable market 
behaviour in a competitive market.    
In agricultural markets the use of a test to exclude domestic sales at under cost is gibberish, 
as the domestic price will be artificially inflated and thus not be comparable to the export 
price. It is striking that EXP under cost are not subject to the concept of “not in the ordinary 
course of trade”, but are rather treaded as “unfairly dumped prices”. 
When NV cannot be based on domestic sales the preferred alternative is CNV. However, this 
test does not take into account that market prices might be globally depressed. The non-
utilization of third country prices as substitutes to domestic transactions is also non-sense, as 
CNV uses the price of the product with a normal profit. This is undoubtedly not comparable 
to transactions in a depressed market, which could better be verified by checking EXP to 
third countries.         
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Even though global dumping is possible in theory, it does not appear to be sensible business 
strategy for small price-taking companies. Even at an aggregated national level it would be a 
questionable strategy, as long as there where are no markets to subsidize from. 
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PART III
6 Constructed Normal Value  
The CNV is the preferred substitute to domestic transactions as NV. Hence, the purpose of 
the CNV is to construct a price for the exported product, as if it would have been sold on the 
domestic market. (Vermulst, 2005, p.34) Thus, the CNV should basically reflect the full 
COP plus a reasonable amount for profits82. This calls for detailed cost analysis of the 
companies concerned.  
The COP should be identical as for the exported product. However, the actual SG&A on 
domestic sales does not necessarily exist as there might be no domestic sales. SG&A must 
then be based on alternatives, as will be discussed subsequently (Van Bael & Bellis, 2004) 
There are diverging views with respect to these cost calculation exercises, Lorentsen (2006) 
states: “There is currently disagreement between Norwegian authorities and the salmon 
farming industry of Norway on one side, and the Commission about how prices and costs 
shall be calculated, this was clear from CR 85/2006, this problem ought to be solved” (p. 35, 
emphasis added).83
The core disagreement in the Salmon case relates to whether the COP of salmon is equal to, 
or lower than, the total cost of running a salmon business. In addition, there should also be a 
question of whether a more normalized COP should be established to reflect the possible 
correlation between certain cost elements as NRC and cyclical downturns.  
Addressing the core disagreement first, these are in essence the main standpoints of the 
parties:    
The EC view:  “costs…inherent to the salmon business” (EU1 at recital 672). 
Norway’s view: “The Panel’s question contrasts costs that are associated with 
production, and costs that are associated with “running” a salmon business. 
According to the Anti-Dumping Agreement, solely those business costs that are 
                                                 
82 ADA Art. 2.2.1 
83 There is a very limited body of relevant caselaw, in the WTO system of a total of 20 anti-dumping disputes from 1995-
2000 only 12 did have rulings on article 2 and only 5 on normal value calculation. Much legal ground is thus still to be 
paved. 
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“associated with” production in the IP may be included in the COP”. (NOR4, at 
recital 169) 
 
It is obviously in Norway in the best interest of Norway to assess the COP as narrowly as 
possible to reduce the chance of finding dumping. Especially with respect to non-recurring 
costs (NRC). The Commission has a broad definition of COP, including as many cost items 
as possible..  
 
The question whether CNV should reflect some standard COP or the actual COP is also 
intriguing, in this respect: 
Norway further claims: “If the COP included costs that could not be reflected in the 
selling price, the NV would necessarily be higher than export price and the 
comparison would be distorted”. (NOR1, at recital 814) 
There is logic in this claim as some cost elements might increase during cyclical downturns 
as e.g. severance pay and asset write-downs. Furthermore, individual firms are not able to 
adjust their selling prices upwards to take into account these cycle dependent costs as most 
companies are price takers84.  
The result of an actual cost based CNV can affect individual dumping margins considerably, 
as firm’s costs will not affect pricing in the short run. Economic rational would give Norway 
support, however there is little in the ADA or the Commissions approach which would 
suggest that an actual cost based CNV will not be utilized, even if so does unreasonably 
reflect the pricing alternatives for a price taker. 85      
                                                 
84 In this respect Lorentzen’s evidence of two year lag in the effect on price could be relevant, however, subject to how the 
costs are measured in time. 
85 According to (Müller et al. p 98, 2005) ”..if data are based on standard, rather than actual costs, the exporter or producer 
must describe the method used to establish the standards, the frequency of their revision  and the treatment of variances”. It 
is then most likely that the Commission will adjust the standard data to comprise actual variances. In ADA article 2.2.2 on 
SG&A reference is made to the use of actual costs. 
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 Figure 13: Normalized vs. actual costs. 
It is the author’s opinion that these questions should be seen in light of the CNV being a 
substitute to a domestic selling price for the IP. In this respect the rational pricing 
alternatives of the companies should be taken into account. Notwithstanding, as nor law, 
practice, or anti-dumping literature seem to oppose an interpretation using actual production 
cost as base for CNV, this question will be kept open86.  
Another fundamental issue not answered by the relevant provisions, is whether the cost of  
production/growth only within the IP could serve as CNV comparable to EXP. The WTO 
salmon case has several indications that the COP is calculated on growth as there is made 
reference to the cost of production in the IP:  “only those costs contributing to production 
during the IP can be included in normal value” (NOR2 recital 258), but also the opposite: 
“The references to ‘cost of production’ in the Provisional Regulation mean weighted 
average cost of production attributable to sales during the period of investigation”. (EU3 at 
recital 63). Consequently, references will be made to both alternatives. 
 
The use of costs of the sales made in the IP, raises fundamental questions on the method of 
allocating costs to inventory. If costs could be perfectly attributed to inventory the cost of 
goods sold in the IP could be found as the production costs incurred in that period. However, 
in practice cost allocation and is ambiguous with basic allocation challenges related to the 
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nature of the business, but also different standards applying between firms depending on 
their legal status, technology, accounting expertise and exactness.   
 
The approach of full allocation of costs will be referred to as project accounting (PA) while 
the inclusion of only direct costs to inventory as annual accounting (AA), as many expenses 
are charged directly to the P&L the year they incur.  
6.1 Central provisions for the determination of CNV 
The fundamental provision for CNV is Basic regulation, art 2.5: “Costs shall normally be 
calculated on the basis of records kept by the party under investigation, provided that such 
records are in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles of the 
country concerned and that it is shown that the records reasonably reflect the costs 
associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration”87. 
As can be derived from the Basic Regulation, the IA must use the records of the company 
under investigation, as long as: 
I) they are in accordance with the country’s GAAP88 and; 
II) they reasonably reflects the costs associated with production and sale of 
the product  under consideration and; 
III) the cost allocations has been historically utilized. 
 
Thus, if the sampled company’s records are consistent not consistent with generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP)89, or the records do not reasonably90 reflect the 
costs of production, the EC can reject the company’s costing documentation. The same 
applies to allocation methods which are not historically utilized. According to Müller et al. 
(1998, p.89): “It would appear that a period of four years meets in any case this 
criterion”. ) 
                                                 
87 Note that there is no requirement of normality.  
88 Generally accepted accounting practices. (http://www.regnskapsstiftelsen.no) 
89 In Norway, as in most other European countries the GAAP is now set by the IFRS system for listed companies, however 
IFRS did not apply in 2003-2004 (IP) and the factual situation is that firms do not use uniform standards.    
90 The reasonability requirement can either not preclude the use of actual data. 
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Basic Regulation Art. 2.5 allow the IA to exercise a substantial degree of discretion when 
constructing the NV. If the companies’ records are wholly or partly GAAP inconsistent the 
Commission can choose to dismiss them. In case they are consistent, the Commission can 
still dismiss them if an alternative allocation method gives a more accurate and reasonable 
reflection of the costs involved (ibid). As cost accounting is not an exact science, 
objections on costing practices can always be presented. In this respect the Commission 
does not hesitate from taking full advantage of the discretion offered by BR Art. 2.4.91
In addition, the Basic Regulation exclusively includes a specific provision expressing 
preference to allocation of costs on the basis of turnover92. The Commission has 
historically reflected wide preference for this allocation method in their investigations. 
(Van Bael & Bellis, 2005). 
6.2 The basics of constructed normal value. 
CNV can be divided in two parts which will be treated subsequently. First, the COP and 
second the Selling General & Administrative costs (SG&A)93 plus a reasonable amount for 
profits94. Individual CNV are calculated for the different sub-products (PNC), which jointly 
constitute the product under investigation.  
Standard accounting practices do not necessarily provide the right information for this 
specific and juridical purpose95. The reason is that companies do not need to know their 
CNV in order to run the business. Undoubtedly, one could argue that it would make sense to 
have own accounts specifically for the anti-dumping purpose as this is an inherent risk 
associated with the business. However, in practise this information would not be relevant for 
                                                 
91 This attitude can be verified through both the Salmon case and in Van Bael & Bellis (2005) p. 75. 
92 Consideration shall be given to evidence submitted on the proper allocation of costs, provided that it is shown that 
such allocations have been historically utilized. In the absence of a more appropriate method, preference shall be given 
to the allocation of costs on the basis of turnover. ADA Art 2.2.1.1 
93 The EC investigating authorities, in conformity with Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, follow a full COP 
approach, where all cost items that are related to the product concerned are taken into account, wherever they are reported 
in the financial statements. IAS/IFRS does not contain any rules on COP as such. (emphasis added). EU at recital 616. 
93 Note that the COP shall be calculated as for the exported product, while the SG&A costs and Profit should 
be calculated as if they incurred on a domestically sold product (Van Bael  and Bellis, 2004). 
 
  
 
 
    
61
the business decision making and therefore valueless. Internally made anti-dumping 
calculations provided by companies to the Commission would probably be disregarded as 
unreliable anyway96.  
The categorization of costs both between but also within COP and SG&A97 can often be 
unclear and dependent upon ambiguous internal accounting practices. Accounting for 
management purposes normally has a prospective function as this is most relevant for 
decision making (Zimmerman, 2003). This in contrast to anti-dumping calculations which 
look at costing retrospectively.  
The accounting discussion in this part should therefore be considered as analytical or 
theoretical accounting, relevant only for the specific AD purpose. However, the logic in this 
thesis shall not compromise the fundamental accounting principle of giving an economically 
sound picture of the business concerned. On the contrary, analogous with the intentions of 
the ADA, where the GAAP consistent cost documentation from producers do not reflect the 
economic reality in an objective manner, adjustments shall be made analogously with the 
reasonableness criteria discussed above.  
The cost documentation for CNV calculations are thus a combination of the financial 
accounts supplemented by questionnaires relating to the internal accounts and other 
supporting documentation.  Owing to strict confidentiality clauses internal cost information 
is not publicly available. For the purpose of this paper illustrative examples must 
consequently be made using fictitious data, as the publicly available case records only 
provide fractions of all the relevant documentation in the case.  
Even though the public documents provide considerable insight, deeper insight is only given 
through case documentation which mostly include the legal disputes of diverging juridical 
(and a few factual) interpretations. Notwithstanding, the information publicly available 
through written pleadings is perceived to be sufficient to establish a comprehensive picture 
of the economic implications of anti-dumping law and its related proceedings98.  
                                                 
96 Bicycles (Taiwan) in Van Bael and Bellis (2004) 
97 The salmon cases official documents. 
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6.2.1 Financial accounts and management 
accounts 
As mentioned, the difference between financial accounts and management accounts is 
fundamental. The Commission systematically requires questionnaire responses from the 
companies concerned both regarding their “COP” (management accounts) and their 
financial accounts. The Commission has treated divergences between internal and external 
accounts as attempts of hiding costs.  
 “…reported COP was tailor-made to serve the purpose of avoiding a finding of 
dumping”. (EU1 at recital 701) 
Still, there is no reason to believe that this is actually the case. The management accounts 
are for prospective decision making and do not necessarily reflects the financial accounts. 
The Commission has tacitly demanded “COP” in the(ir) legal sense while the companies 
have provided their “COP” as reflected in management accounts.  
6.3 Allocation of costs.  
As a substantial part of WTO salmon disputes relate to the ambiguous nature of cost 
allocations and accounting practices. Recalling Basic Regulation Art. 2 (5): ” Authorities 
shall consider all available evidence on the proper allocation of costs,..”. In United States-
Softwood lumber (Vermulst 2005 p.38) the Panel addressed the basic role of the investigating 
authority regarding cost allocation. The AB, on appeal, held that the IA when considering, 
must “reflect on” and “weight the merit of” all available evidence, on the proper allocation 
of costs, which may include a comparison between allocation methods. Consequently, the IA 
is provided with both discretion, and an obligation to evaluate different allocation methods. 
 
Ad hoc cost allocations to accommodate anti-dumping investigations will be disregarded99. 
Thus, if cost allocation is not done properly in the first place, the discretion passes on to the 
IA. 
 
                                                 
99 Bicycles (Taiwan) in Van Bael and Bellis (2004)  
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6.3.1 Allocation amongst different products  
Normally cost allocation between a manufacturer’s different models is one of the most 
challenging aspects when constructing NV. In the salmon case the product concerned is 
defined quite broadly - as farmed salmon in any presentation. Even though some of the 
sampled companies also produce farmed trout and other species, the farming processes are 
well-separated. As the same production facilities and production lines are seldom used for 
multiple species, at least not simultaneously.  Still, some cost allocation challenges regarding 
product varieties arise after the farming stages, when the salmon is further processed into its 
final cutting and category. Allocation problems are also prominent in the determination of 
SG&A in companies with multiple business activities.   
6.3.2 Cost allocations in time 
The most relevant question here is whether the company concerned uses: 
I)  annual accounting (AA) or,  
II) project accounting (PA) 
There is evidence that among the sampled companies both methods were utilized in different 
variants. (NOR2, at recital 280) 
 
One of the distinctive aspects of salmon farming is the lengthy production period, compared 
to most goods manufacturing. To get better financial oversight, some producers use “project 
accounting” as their preferred financial reporting method. The method is also indicated by 
the Commission to be the most suitable for salmon farming usefulness. 100
  
- Project accounting (PA): Using this method costs are accumulated for each salmon 
generation, from the fertilization of the egg (or smolt), until the slaughter of the fully 
grown salmon. During the farming period the costs are recognized as assets in inventory 
section of the balance sheet. Not until the salmon in eventually sold, the accumulated 
costs are recognized as expenses and entered into the Profit and Loss account. (EU1 
recital 609). Project accounting with perfect costs allocation would make it possible to 
                                                 
100 The potential allocation challenge of sales stock of frozen salmon is not taken into account. Anyhow the question does 
not appear to be significant for the salmon case. 
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determine the exact production cost of the salmon sold in the IP and would also charge 
to expense the relevant costs in the IP. 
 
- Annual accounting (AA): When using this method the financial account recognises 
several overhead and indirect costs in the year where they incur and not when sales are 
made. This makes it challenging to find the true cost of the salmon sold in the IP, as 
inventory is not perfectly valuated.  
The most practical method when using AA is to calculate the salmon production cost of 
the IP, this method was used in the salmon case. COP is then based of the biological 
growth of the IP101. 
 
Table 4: COP of biomass growth in IP 
Evaluation of cost allocation methods: 
The first approach is most consistent with the matching and cost recovery of principle of 
financial accounting and would be the most accurate to find the actual COP of the salmon 
sold in the IP.  
                                                 
101 This method makes sense in e.g. forestry as the exact cost of each tree is very difficult to assess, as they might have 
been growing for a hundred years.  
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The second alternative finds COP of the growth of salmon in the IP. Including inventory it is 
an estimation of the COP of the products sold in the IP. Excluding inventory the COP of the 
IP growth is found. The practicality of these methods for companies using AA is evident.   
In the Salmon case the producers used PA, AA or a combination. It is difficult to verify the 
exact practices employed by the sampled companies, notwithstanding the fact that this is 
also contested by the parties in the WTO salmon case. The next example shows the 
difference in COP between two companies using respectively AA (with inventory valued at 
direct cost) and PA.   
 
Table 5: Differences in COP using PA and AA 
Table 5 shows how the use of PA with perfect cost allocation gives a realistic COP while the 
AA, due to non-absorption of all costs generate a different COP for the different years due to 
the practice of charging overheads to the P&L the year they incur. 
6.3.2.1 Period of investigation and production period 
Recalling section 5.2.5 on the POI and the abovementioned accounting practise it is worth 
emphasising that the costs incurred in the POI are chiefly irrelevant if one is to determine the 
costs of salmon sold in the IP, especially if AA on growth is utilized as the accounts from 
the POI simply does not then reflect the costs of producing salmon sold in the POI. It 
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appears that the practice and legal status is rather diffuse on this particular matter as 
companies are normally asked to report POI data in the questionnaire.  
However, as appears in the recent WTO case documentation, and as cited under it seems that 
the reality of salmon farming has (finally) been taken into account expanding the cost data 
collection outside the POI to reflect the fact that costs related to sales in the POI incur during 
the lengthy production cycle particular to the salmon business.    
“The costs that have to be compared to the sales of harvested salmon during the 
investigation period are precisely those that have been accumulated over the farming 
lifespan of the salmon, i.e. three years”. (EU1 at recital 618)  
Since there is difference between the POI and the production period (PP) in this particular 
case, it is needed to differentiate between the two terms.  The concepts of POI and PP are not 
clearly distinguished in the Salmon case which obviously leads to confusion.  
Figure 14: Cost allocation project accounting  
6.3.2.2 Depreciation and writedowns 
Assets with finite lifespan shall be depreciated according to their expected lifetime or market 
value evolution. When the book value of an asset is higher than the market value and it is not 
a short time fluctuation, the asset must be written down pursuant to GAAP102. The same 
applies to realization of the asset e.g. shut down or sale.  
Ideally, the depreciation should have been subject to running adjustments, so no massive 
write-down was ever necessary. Unfortunately, this is difficult in practice as market value is 
                                                 
102 Note that the cost allocations according to IFRS/GAAP are not necessarily relevant for the COP. However, at least the 
GAAP might explain how and why cost allocation problems emerge.    
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not always easy available and market price fluctuations difficult to assess right and 
appropriately. If depreciation charges were to be attributed exactly right to the COP of 
relevant salmon the assets value loss should be attributed directly to the production on an 
instant basis. This is utopia.  
Still, with accurate accounting, yearly value loss should be possible to calculate and allocate 
appropriately. The problem is moreover that write-downs in practice are ultimately 
necessary because this task has not been performed scrupulously enough in the past. For an 
IA it is difficult to assess retrospectively, when in the period from the acquirement or the last 
write-down, the asset has been subject to the loss of value. Linear re-amortization can then 
be the best available alternative. 
Write-down’s on assets are done because the depreciation scheme has not provided the right 
charge to expense of the costs associated with the assets loss of value or because the basis 
for the assets value has changed. As depreciations are normally charged the COP, the 
following statement from the Commission makes sense:  
 “..the asset was depreciated too slowly and that therefore the COP in past years was 
underestimated”. (EUR1 at recital 654). 
As far as the product under investigation has had advantage of the particular asset, it makes 
sense to attribute a portion of the write-down to the COP of IP. The same would then also 
apply if there was a gain, as the asset would have hade to high depreciations in the past. It is 
worth noting that the Commission does indicate that it would have included an eventual gain 
as a negative cost. (EUR1  Recital 660-661). 
In the salmon case the concept of non-recurring costs is central. Write-down’s or write down 
related costs are an important part of NRC.  
6.3.2.3 The three year weighted average approach  
Since no companies included NRC in their COP submissions, the Commission initially took 
the approach of allocating all NRC from the IP to the production.    
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“At the provisional stage, the Commission included all extraordinary expenses 
applicable to the product concerned, which had been reported by companies during 
the IP”. 103
 
The Commission partly corrected this logic in its definitive determination as explained 
underneath. 
“..the Commission has decided to take the extraordinary costs reported by companies 
in the sample during the last three years, based on the most recently available 
financial statements, and to allocate one third of these costs to salmon production in 
the IP, on the basis of turnover104. Three years was considered an appropriate time 
period as this is the average length of time that it takes to grow a salmon from a smolt 
to a harvestable salmon”. (ibid)  
 
The averaging of costs reported for the last three years including the IP could be seen as a 
step in direction of a sounder cost allocation (normalizing). However, there is no rational 
linkage between a third of all the non-recurring costs of a three year period and the amount 
of costs incurred in production of the relevant salmon, as there is no link between asset life 
and a salmon cycle, which anyhow varies between 30 and 36 months (Kredittilsynet, 2007).  
“It is, however, true that allocation of the costs over a period of time would remove 
any undue effect caused by the timing of the decisions of the companies to report 
these costs. Ideally, all extraordinary costs reported for each separate asset should be 
allocated over the useful life of that asset to arrive at an average annual cost. 
However, it is to be noted that none of the companies concerned carried out this 
exercise”. (Ibid) 
 
Recalling the discussion in the precedent sections, the Commission apparently justifies its 
flawed allocation practice by noting that the companies concerned did allocate NRC neither 
prospectively nor retrospectively. It is also noteworthy that the Commission explicitly states 
that the ideal allocation is over the useful life of an asset, while contra intuitively using other 
standards in the dumping determinations. Norway later made similar contests to the 
Commissions approach in its panel submissions.105  
 
NRC by nature are irregular and difficult and thus difficult to allocate to the COP. Even 
when using a full cost PA approach, they will not be allocated to production. Consequently, 
                                                 
103 Council regulation  (EC) 628/2006 at recital 16-18 
104 The allocation of costs by turnover must relate to the allocation between business segments in order to make sense. 
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the problem of allocating NRC is universal and applies independently of the allocation 
method. The three year average, as applied by the Commission is an attempt to apply a 
consistent approach to this matter.    
6.4 Cost of production 
The first part of the CNV calculation is to determine the production cost. Normally the 
questionnaire sent by the Commission to the exporters under investigation split production 
costs into three categories.106 The COP are the costs which can be relate to the production of 
the product concerned, this in contrast to the SG&A costs which normally apply to the 
business as a whole and is not necessarily related to the production process.  
The three COP categories with their problem areas: 
I) Cost of materials 
- Problem area: transfer pricing. 
II) Cost of direct labour 
- Problem area: none of specific interest 
III) Manufacturing overheads 
- Problem areas: write downs, capital cost, depreciation, allocation. 
The questionnaires sent to companies concerned: 
It is evident that this considerable information requests can be burdensome, especially for 
SME, which is also recognized by the Commission. The Commission has shown more 
flexible to accept minor errors and information holes when receiving information, without 
restoring to “facts available”, than the case is for the USDOC. Salmon companies are seldom 
“top heavy” and have few management and accounting resources compared to their turnover. 
It is important to establish a dialogue with the Commission, especially for smaller non-listed 
companies. More generally companies should also know that the Commissions officials are 
normally not competent on the specific industry, as the internal policy is prepared to deal 
with any case. The Commission has also expressed a concern for its shortage of accountant 
competence. This implies that the companies must be ready to supply detailed evidence on 
the reasonableness of their different accounting practices. (Stevenson, 2005) 
                                                                                                                                                      
105 Norways WTO submissions 
106 Van Bael & Bellis (2004) 
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6.4.1 Cost of materials  
The cost of materials is the cost of input needed for the production of farmed salmon. There 
are two main cost drivers, the smolt cost witch summarizes the cost of the first stage of 
salmon farming and the additional feed cost in order to bring the smolt into harvestable 
salmon. (Fiskeridirektoratet, 2005)  Both cost elements have been subject to disagreements 
in the prevailing case.  
6.4.1.1 Transfer pricing  
According to Zimmermann, (2003, p 755) “the transfer price is the cost charged by one 
segment of an organization for a product or service supplied to another segment of the same 
organization”. Transfer prices can be applied for a variety of reasons including internal 
profitability measurement, opportunity cost assessment and tax purposes.  
In the PSF case (Van Bael & Bellis, 2004)purchasing prices from related parties were 
disregarded as these where significantly lower than the prevailing market price. 
Analogously, in Certain iron or steel ropes and cables (ibid) the Commission stated that it 
does not allow for subtraction of profits in transfer pricing cases involving related 
companies. 
In the Norwegian Salmon case107 the Norwegian salmon industry also claimed that the profit 
margin of related smolt suppliers should be deducted when assessing the cost of raw 
materials purchased from related parties. It was argued that this approach would be 
consistent with the approach taken for integrated companies, where the smolt COP, net of 
profit, is included in the cost calculation of the product concerned which corresponds to a 
cost based transfer price of smolt108. 
The Commission responded that it had no data to verify any profit or loss on the purchase of 
smolt from related companies. Furthermore it claimed that there was: “no evidence to 
suggest that the use of these transfer prices affected the reliability of the constructed NV for 
salmon”109. Hence, disregarding the adjustment claim of the Norwegian industry.  
                                                 
107 Council Regulation  (EC) 85/2006 
108 This does not take into account the opportunity cost of smolt. 
109 Council Regulation (EC) 85/2006 at recital 24. 
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The basic economic logic in this respect must be that, everything else held constant, how the 
company is legally organized should not affect the CNV, hence adjustments should be done 
to level for differences deriving from legal structure.  
One alternative could be to calculate arm’s length prices on processes that are internalized in 
integrated companies and outsourced by others to related or non-related parties. For that 
purpose it would be necessary to define which business activities are core for the industry 
under investigation, and which are not and compute arm’s length prices for the non-core 
activities. 
The other alternative could be to reflect differences in business activities through different 
final profit mark-up. The mark-up is currently a flat 8 % for all salmon producers110, 
irrespective of legal structure and transfer pricing practices. The mark-up should then be 
adjusted to take into account different integration and hence value-adding business activities. 
 
Figure 15: Integrated and non-integrated company  
As demonstrated by Hirschleifer (1956) when there is separate ownership in the non 
integrated companies we get double mark up when profit is added at each link. This gives 
higher CNV for the same value chain depending on legal integration. 
Mathematically: 
CNVi = (1+k)MCtotal,i = (1+k)(MCsalmon+Psmolt_internal)=(1+k)(MCsalmon+MCsmolt) 
CNVs = (1+k)MCtotal,a = (1+k)[MCsalmon+Psmolt_market]=(1+k)(MCsalmon+(1+k)MCsmolt) 
                                                 
 
 72
Which approach is chosen is of secondary importance, what matters is the consistent 
application of either adjustments of input prices to arm’s length for the business activities 
defined to be “non-core” or alternatively adjust the profit margin to encompass differences 
in the value chain. The current regime of a flat profit margin and differences in the criteria 
for input costing is not consistent and will yield skewed results. Thus, in contrast with the 
Commissions view, it is evident that transfer prices, are relevant for proper calculation of 
NV.  
When a smolt company is owned by a farmer the profit margin paid on smolt will 
theoretically be paid back as dividends. If dividends from related companies are fully 
deducted from CNV in the SG&A calculations, is it not necessary to deduct the profit 
margin element, as claimed by Norwegian producers111.  
The use of arm’s length prices and inclusion of dividend will only reflect reality in the long 
run, and is therefore not a viable alternative for CNV calculations. Thus, using the full cost 
of smolt and not including any profit/loss from subsidiaries will probably be the best 
alternative when different ownership interests are present. When the smolt company also 
sells smolt externally, profit or loss from these non-relevant smolt business activities should 
not be included or deducted in the CNV of salmon. In any case, the main issue here is that 
the profit/loss on smolt should only be included once. 
6.4.2 Manufacturing overheads  
The manufacturing overheads are typically incurred at the farming site or at the slaughter. 
While the SG&A incur at a company or group level. As salmon is normally farmed alone 
there should be few problems of manufacturing overhead allocation between salmon and 
other species112. 
The main challenge is then the allocation of overheads between the different salmon 
generations. As salmon is harvested all year round several generations are in the sea 
simultaneously. If three generations are harvested each year there will on average be nine 
different generations, at nine different stages of development from smolt to harvestable 
salmon.  
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How should the administration and the insurance costs etc. be allocated on a yearly or 
generational basis is then the relevant question. The answer is not straightforward as one 
generation might be put in the sea in December and another has been growing the whole 
year. The best approach is probably then to allocate the overheads according to the increase 
in biomass value of the particular generation for each year. A (direct) cost based value 
assessment might be reasonable in this respect. Thus, the salmon that grows the most is 
attributed the highest portion of overheads. Even though, advanced growth supervision 
system now exists, these allocation issues are still ambiguous.  
6.5 Non-recurring costs  
The concepts of non-recurring and extraordinary costs have been disputed vigorously in the 
WTO Salmon case. The thesis will now discuss objective cost allocation from an economic 
viewpoint, with respect to relevant legal guidance and the particularities of the salmon case.  
Cost allocation of NRC is not straightforward and raises a number of intriguing questions. 
This relates to the fact that NRC usually relate to wider periods of time than the one where 
they incur. It further relates to the basic way the NV is constructed, as firms own accounts 
shall normally be the primary source of information allocation of non-recurring costs is often 
an area where firms can show no records, hence the Commission having considerable 
discretion. 
The relevant legal provision for this particular problem area is Article 2.2.1.1 WTO & EC 
Basic regulation 2(5): “Unless already reflected in the cost allocations under this 
sub-paragraph, costs shall be adjusted appropriately for those non-recurring items of cost 
which benefit future and/or current production (or for circumstances in which costs during 
the period of investigation are affected by start-up operations)”. (Parenthesis added) 
The extreme standpoints of respectively Norwegian farmers and the Commission in the 
prevailing EC case, has been respectively to exclude all NRC or include all NRC as they 
have incurred. 113  
                                                                                                                                                      
111 Council Regulation EC 86/2006 
112 Salmon and trout might be slaughtered at the same facility but never at the same time. 
113 Council Regulation (EC) 86/2006 
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EC view (EUR1):  “..the EC confirms that when a cost is not explicitly qualified as 
related to the discontinuation of the salmon business as a whole nor as an 
extraordinary cost outside the decision power of management, but rather is inherent 
in the risks associated with the salmon business, it is part of the result of continuing 
operations and should therefore be counted as part of the full COP of salmon” recital 
633. 
Norway’s (NOR1): At recital 809. Under Article 2.2.1.1, the COP cannot include all 
NRC. Instead, it can include solely an allocation of “those” NRC that “benefit” 
current or future production…” and at recital 870: “Under Article 2.2.1.1, the EC was 
not entitled to include the NRC that resulted from the closure of these production 
facilities in the COP for the IP. The costs were not incurred in order to support or 
otherwise benefit production in that year”. 
 
Thus, basically the EC wants to include all NRC except those subject to the strict condition 
of being extraordinary. Norway’s view is somewhat confusing, as it has a special 
interpretation of art. 2.2.1.1 and of the word “benefit”. (NOR1 & NOR2)  
Norway seeks to justify the exclusion of several NRC items, using as their main argument 
that they do not benefit or contribute to production of the like product in the IP or in the 
future. (NOR1)  The issue of current and future benefit is raised by ADA 2.2.1.1. The exact 
meaning of the law’s text is however difficult to understand. In any case, the rational 
interpretation should be on allocation according to the benefit from the NRC on the product 
produced or sold in the IP.  
According to Czako et al. (2003), non-recurring costs are typical for entering or exiting 
markets and take place at one particular point in time as opposed to recurring costs that incur 
on an even basis. Restructuring costs are exemplified explicitly by write-off of assets made 
redundant or severance payments to staff.  
Müller et al (1998), emphasize that “only a cost item which has been written off over one 
year, which normally would have been written down over a number of years (may) qualify 
for such an adjustment”. They add that these assessments are subject to the particular 
circumstances of each case.  
Also costs written down prior to the IP might be re-amortized if the current production did 
benefit from it. This is relevant for the salmon case as non-recurring costs falling within 
2001-2003 but outside the POI have been included in the COP with one-third.  The re-
amortization of non-recurring costs falling outside the POI and PP is only possible to take 
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into account in they have incurred historically. Future NRC which fall prospectively of the 
POI cannot be accounted for.  
 In simple terms following economic rationale should be benchmarked: 
- Costs which benefit future production should somehow be deducted if included in the 
COP of the IP’s sales. 
- Costs which have benefited current production, independently of when they are 
charged as expenses, should be included in the COP of the IP, when there is a 
reasonable connection between the cost and the production. 
- Costs that benefited previous production should be deducted if they are included in 
the COP of the IP sales, as they should not have been included in the first place. 
General example on future benefit: 
Assume a salmon company makes two annual salmon specific TNOK 1.000 R&D 
investments in 2003 and 2004. Then, if the investments are charged as expenses directly it is 
evident that R&D cost to COP in 2003 and 2004 would be unreasonably high. The rationale 
of accruing the cost over a longer period is evident as long as the value of the R&D 
investment is not limited to the period in which these costs are charged as expenses. 114
Table 6: R&D investment example, prospective depreciation 
 2003 2004 (“IP”) 2005 2006-8 
Year of cost incurred 1000’ 1000’   
Adjustment when benefits for 
current/future production 
200’ 400’ 400’ 1000 
   
Thus, the IA is given discretion by law to make this adjustment if they believe this to be 
more correct than the conservative approach suggested by GAAP. As can be seen in the 
table, following this alternative approach, if the IP happened to be in 2008 some costs would 
have to be allocated to that production, even though the cost were charged as an expense 
back in 2004. 
An example of benefit to past production: 
There is no direct indication in the provision that non-recurring cost could also be accrued 
backwards to production sold before the IP. Even so, it makes a whole lot of sense that a 
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write-down from a close-down should be attributed backwards to whatever relevant 
production, to reflect that the yearly depreciation amount had been to low in the past.  
Including the whole write-down would make companies, which more or less coincidently 
did incur heavy write-downs in the IP, an unreasonable addition to COP. On the other hand, 
excluding these write-downs would unlawfully benefit those companies which have 
underestimated depreciation, hence previously underestimating COP. 
Table 7: Retrospective depreciation 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 (IP)Æ 
Investment of 1000’115 200’ 200’ 200’ 200’ 
Sales price    100 
Write-down    100 
Backwards allocation due to “too 
low depreciation” 
25’ 25’ 25’ 25’ 
Sum 225 225 225 225 (300)  
Evidently it is not possible to go back in time to adjust depreciations. The example however 
shows that it is viable when the purpose is to establish a reasonable COP for the anti-
dumping purpose. Using the Commissions “standard” three year average method the yearly 
amount would be higher as historical lifetime of the asset was longer than three years.  
Unfortunately there is an inherent problem with this approach as it can only adjust for flaws 
in historical data. If the last available data reported to the IA belongs to the IP, it will not be 
possible to take into account write-downs done after the IP. As long as the write downs 
exceed the write ups this will lead to a systematic underestimation of COP. It would be 
necessary to wait to conclude investigations for several years to assure that depreciations 
during IP have been correct. 
6.5.1.1 Extraordinary costs  
The question of extraordinary costs has also been raised in the WTO salmon case. 
Extraordinary costs are by nature not derived from normal business activity or risks 
associated with continuous business operation. Hence, it seems rational in accordance with 
Art. 2 of the Basic Regulation, to exclude extraordinary costs from CNV.  
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However, for most practical purposes, there are few costs items which can rightfully be 
labelled extraordinary costs and some commentators have even suggested to exclude the 
item from accounting standards116.  
Other costs which are not included in the (gross) P&L are cost related to business 
discontinuation and change in accounting standards. What constitutes business 
discontinuation necessarily has some degree of flexibility in interpretation, while the latter is 
not subject to extensive interpretation. 
6.5.2 Biomass: Mortality 
There is consensus among the parties that the cost of dead salmon (mortality) must be 
allocated to the COP of the product under investigation. It is important that no double 
counting of both the cost of feed etc. and mortality occur. Thus when calculating the COP 
using AA on growth, mortality shall affect only the denominator if the value of the dead fish 
is zero. Using PA the cost’s already allocated to the dead fish must be reallocated to the live.  
6.5.3 Biomass: market price volatility writedowns 
When the expected market price of salmon drops under the cost based book value, the 
biomass’ value must be written-down pursuant to GAAP. In Council Regulation (EC) 
85/2006 the Commission refers to two companies which claimed the write-downs of the 
values of biomass should not be included in salmon COP. It was further claimed that these 
write-downs refer to accounting adjustments based on the projected future sales value of 
salmon, and are not a true cost. 
In the same Regulation the Commission117 reversed the initial inclusion of write-downs of 
biomass in the COP. This approach is inconsistent with the Commissions standpoint in the 
other questions on write-downs: 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
115 Depreciation: linear 5 years 
116 E.g: Exxon Mobile did not categorize their costs associated with the Exxon Valdez catastrophe as extraordinary costs as 
this was indeed an inherent risk of being in the oil industry. On the other, costs associated with natural disasters as 
hurricanes and earthquakes, which are at least not business specific, can be treated as extraordinary costs.  (EC1 at recital 
629).  
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“Where the companies were able to demonstrate that these write-downs were indeed 
simply a result of changing market values and not due to any other factor, such as 
escapes, mortality or disease, the Commission concluded that these costs should not 
be included for the NV calculation”. 118
The reason this problem arose in the first place, has most probably relation to the confused 
status of the IP and the use of AA. It does not make-sense to make write-downs within the 
same year in which a product is sold. A write down in the IP must therefore relate to 
prospective sales and should not be included in COP of the IP using AA.     
When assessing production costs retrospectively as is the case of CNV calculations, the 
existence or non-existence of inventory value write-downs should be irrelevant for the 
calculation of CNV, as long as all relevant costs are included, once. Whether costs are 
charged as expense in 2002, 2003 or at sale within the IP in 2004, will not affect the COP 
using PA. The notion that write-downs are not a true cost makes no particular sense, in this 
respect, as write-downs are only relevant for when costs are periodized as expenses, not the 
COP of salmon.    
6.5.4 Biomass: Deformity 
When the biomass is deformed the value of the biomass must be written down as a 
consequence of its lower anticipated market value. Norway claims that these write-downs 
shall not be included in the COP, while the Commission has the opposite view. (NOR1 and 
EUR1) It should be noted that deformity of salmon is not a normal occurrence, however 
downgrading to different qualities is normal.  
The question can best be illustrated with a simplified example:  
Assume Salmon Ltc has two full grown salmons on stock; A & B, and the expected selling 
price are NOK 20 for each. The cost based book value is NOK 15 for each. If salmon B dies 
there is no doubt that the actual COP of salmon A must be NOK 30. 
However, assuming that salmon B does not die but rather gets sick, which makes its skin and 
meat of poor quality. If the expected selling price of salmon B is then reduced to NOK 10 a 
                                                 
118 Council Regulation (EC) 85/2006 at recital 22. 
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write-down of NOK 5 is necessary. If the sick salmon B is eventually sold at NOK 10 and 
salmon A at ordinary price 20, the COP of Salmon A must now be NOK 15 + 5 = 20. 
As most companies are price takers with no possibility to adjust sales prices to unusual 
events leading to higher costs, it would make more sense to only include the average 
sickness or mortality rate when calculating COP, in order to avoid cost these random 
fluctuations. Even though one could rightfully argue that salmon B’s anomalous sickness 
should not affect salmon A’s COP, using actual data this allocation is inevitable. 
The existence of different qualities as e.g. superior and ordinary, yielding different market 
prices, bring about the question of how these write-downs should be taken into account. The 
alternatives are either to allocate some additional cost to superior or to apply identical CNV 
on the two categories, the last alternative would increase the probability to find dumping if 
ordinary is exported. This might explain why Norwegian firms do not export production 
quality fish119. 
6.5.5 Farming licenses writedowns 
In Norway farming licenses are mandatory requirements in order for companies to farm 
salmon. Farming licenses are treated as having infinite life for accounting purposes and are 
therefore not subject to depreciation. Their value is either based on the net present value of 
future sales or the market value. The only recurring cost is the capital costs of the initial 
investment. In the salmon case several companies claimed that write-downs of salmon 
farming licences should not be included in the COP.  
In the Commissions view these write-downs were related to expenses which had incurred 
and had to be borne by the companies concerned and consequently rejected the industry’s 
claim. The write-downs were allocated using the three year average approach120. Even 
though the period of allocation can be argued, this allocation to companies using AA seems 
justifiable.  
                                                 
119 FJORDSEAFOOD.com 
120 Council regulation (EC) 85/2006 
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Figure 16: Licence depreciation 
Using PA, the first prerequisite in order to include a write down is that the use of that license 
has contributed to the production of the salmon sold in the IP. As we can see from figure 18 
the asset value development can take an infinite number of paths from acquisition to write-
down if no previous value adjustment is done. The right amount to attribute to the current 
production depends on the licenses value fluctuations since the acquisition and the price 
fluctuation driver. 
If the asset is valued at market value, ideally, the actual value loss of the asset, in the 
production period of the relevant salmon generation(s), is the amount to be allocated. 
Assuming a linear value loss is a not uncommon, however the re-amortization period of only 
three years as applied by the Commission seems random when the actual period from the last 
value assessment or adjustment would normally be found in historical accounts.  
The illiquid market for these licenses makes value assessment before asset realization a 
challenging exercise and is certainly an aspect which makes accurate cost allocation to CNV 
difficult for the IA. Therefore the net present value valuation is common on these assets. As 
present value calculation depends on the firms costs, it would be somewhat awkward to add 
write-down costs to a firm because e.g. their feed cost has increased.  
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In this case one might arguably claim that no write-down should affect COP when the asset 
is not realized or terminated, as this would add an additional accounting cost to the COP in 
downturns.  
6.5.6 Facility closures write-downs 
The facility closure cost disagreements also centre on the problem of inaccuracies in the 
depreciation of assets. According to Norway’s claim neither gains nor losses should be 
attributed to the COP. In one specific example, the write-downs were done before the IP and 
the EC consequently attributed one third of these costs to the COP of salmon in the IP 
(EUR1). As far as the salmon sold in the IP was produced or partly produced in the closed 
facilities the Commissions approach of including these write-downs can be supported. 
However, analogously with the logic of farming licences the relevant period for re-
amortization should be the time the asset has contributed to production in the company or 
the time from the last value adjustment. If the asset is depreciated linearly in the company’s 
accounts it would make a whole lot of sense to use the same appreciation method and period.     
If the salmon increased their value by 50 % in the now closed facility and the facility was ten 
years old, a more correct retrospective allocation for PA could then, assuming linear 
depreciation, be: 0.5 * 0.1 = 1/20, and not 1/3 as is utilized by the EC. 121 The Norwegian 
view would only be correct if the product sold in the IP did not benefit from the facility at 
all. In the AA case the Community’s approach is an alternative but also here a similar 
approach of assessing the actual relationship between the salmon sold and the assets fall in 
value could be tried.   
6.5.7 Severance payments 
Severance payments are normally paid to employees made redundant due to rationalization 
or down-sizing. Severance payments can be paid in many ways but for simplicity we can 
assume that all employees who are fired get a one time disbursement. As long as the salmon 
sold in the IP has benefited from this labour it could be reasonable to include (a portion of) 
the severance costs, as suggested by the Commission (EUR1) 
                                                 
121 Note that there are normally three generations in the sea (or more) at the same time. Three with identical yearly value 
increase is assumed. 
 82
If this non-recurring cost coincidently falls within the period when the relevant salmon is 
produced there is obviously a need to make some allocation. The nature of employees is 
different from assets and they might be regarded more as an input which companies must 
pay for on a semi-fixed basis.  
The first and intriguing question might be if it is right to treat severance payments as a shut 
down cost or an investment.   
Shut down cost: For oil installations the depreciations take into account that there is an 
abolition cost at the end of the assets life-cycle. If this approach was to be followed the 
severance payment would have to be re-amortized retrospectively and a portion would then 
be attributed the relevant production where the now fired employees contributed to 
production.  
Investment: The efficiency improvement cost could also be regarded as an investment in 
future profitability. Future production will benefit from lover labour costs and will therefore 
be the relevant production to bear this investment cost. As there is little doubt that the 
decision to make some employees redundant is done with a prospective vision this might be 
the most reasonable alternative122. 
The second challenge is over which period this cost shall be allocated. In the first situation 
the average period the employees have been employed might be a reasonable period. In the 
second case there is no obvious period in which costs should be allocated, but the period 
should probably coincide with an appropriate horizon for an organizational restructuring.  
6.5.8 Start up costs/restructuring costs 
The rules on allocation of start-up costs were an innovation in the 1994 Code, as a 
compromise between several GATT members in the contentious problem of cost 
recovery123. A provision was included to account for differences in costs related to a 
                                                 
122 This is not consistent at all with Norway’s view: “A severance payment is, therefore, a special payment made to ensure 
that employees cease to provide services that benefit production. The payment does not, therefore, benefit either the current 
or future production of goods” and “Norway contends that the severance payments should not be included, at all, in the 
COP because, under Article 2.2.1.1, they are NRC that do not benefit current or future production of salmon”.  (NOR1 at 
Recital 882) 
123 Muller et al. 1998 
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products life cycle. This is typically valid for high-tech products with high early cost 
commitments, but sharply declining unit costs as volumes increase. 
The rules for adjustments of costs which are affected by start up operations are given by 
Basic Regulation Art 2 (5) last subparagraph124. The basic idea is that relevant unit costs 
shall be adjusted to the level that prevails at the end of the IP, or after the IP, if the start up 
phase is lengthier and appropriate cost documentation is provided the investigation 
authority in time125. Start-up operation and life-cycle implications outside this extended IP 
are not taken into account. 
The definition of start-up operations is quite strict and involves “the use of new production 
facilities requiring substantial additional investment and low capacity utilization 
rates”.(Müller 1998, p.93) The Commission restrictive approach to allowances for start 
up’s which can be verified by case-law. E.g. in Hot Rolled Coils (Van Bael & Bellis, 2004) 
adjustments to account for low capacity utilization were not accepted as the low capacity 
utilization was not due to start-up operations. In Certain large electrolytic aluminium 
capacitors (ibid), one producer requested a start up adjustment related to new machinery. 
The claim was rejected on the grounds that it concerned the normal replacement of 
machinery which was depreciated according to standard accounting method. Furthermore, 
the producer could not demonstrate the existence of any de facto start up phase.   
Thus, in order to be granted allowances for start up operations there must be significant 
investments beyond pure replacement of old machinery and high unit costs due to low 
utilization. The mere existence of low utilization or significant investments, are not 
themselves enough to allow for cost adjustments. Thus, eventual Norwegian claims under 
the start-up provision would seem to be far-fetched.   
6.6 Seeling General & Administrative costs  
SG&A costs include all costs which are incurred in connection with the sales of the like 
product in the exporter’s domestic market, other than those attributed directly to the 
                                                 
124 WTO 2.2.1.1. 
125 Note that this has implications for one of the ordinary course of trade tests. 
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production as COP, and except SG&A126 costs particularly related to export sales (Van Bael 
and Bellis, 2005)127.  
Previously IA had almost unfettered discretion in this field. (Li, 2001) The rules on SG&A 
allocation still offer the Commission significant leeway even though they are now among the 
most elaborated of the Basic Regulation. Even though material improvements have been 
undergone the SG&A determinations still remain: “One of the most complex - and arbitrary 
- aspects of CNV calculations” (Vermulst, 2005, 37p). 
As for the COP the accounting documentation of the companies under investigation are the 
point of departure for the Commission. This implies that the initial classification of a cost 
can decide whether it is included or not in the relevant portion of SG&A, as part of the CNV. 
E.g. if a cost category is defined as a general expense the company under investigation 
cannot necessarily pick and choose which cost are not related to the product concerned, at a 
later stage. 128  
If companies cannot prove a relationship or lack of relationship between costs and sales, the 
Commission will allocate on the basis of turnover129. The Commission does not stand back 
to reallocate SG&A on facts available when they have indications that the allocations and 
documentation from the companies under investigation are artificial, unrealistic or 
incomplete. However, the Commission is more flexible than the USDOC according to 
Stevenson (2005). 
While there is always a COP there are not always domestic SG&A, as no domestic sales 
might exist at all. SG&A by nature cover the whole of the business’ activities entailed by the 
company concerned. In many cases this includes a broad range of business activities in 
addition to those of the like product (salmon). These implications will be discussed in more 
detail as the rules for SG&A are presented.  
 
According to ADA Art. 2.2.2 and Art. 2(6) of the Basic Regulation, four methods exist for 
                                                 
126 Including general financial expenses 
127 Nb! Art. 20 (C)  
128 See WT/DS264/R (2004) 
129 Note that ad hoc cost allocation to adapt to the anti-dumping investigations will be disregarded. However, the companies 
can always support the Commission with additional documentation to facilitate allocations that are not normally done by 
the companies.  
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the allocation of SG&A and profits. There are some minor differences in the wordings of the 
two legal texts and in their structure. Alternative I) is preferred being the company’s own 
cost data on the like product. When the company under investigation has no sufficient 
domestic sales of any PNC, the alternative methods must apply. There is no formal hierarchy 
established by the WTO for alternatives II - IV, however the EC has signalled some 
hierarchical preferences in their implementation as they have not reproduced the order of the 
alternative approaches. Thus, the main basic principles, in order as listed in the Basic 
Regulation are:  
I) SG&A costs shall be based on “actual data pertaining to production and sales, in 
the ordinary course of trade, of the like product, by the company under 
investigation”.  
II) Use weighted average SG&A and profit data on the like product from other 
companies130 under investigation. 
III) The actual amount applicable to production and sales, in the ordinary course of 
trade, of the same general category131 of products for the company in question. 
IV) Any other reasonable method    
The use of method one implies that the domestic sales of a like product (some model under 
investigation) must be in the ordinary course of trade in order to qualify as basis for these 
cost estimations. No low volume test is explicitly stated. Thus, the SG&A and profit margins 
from this particular model are allocated to the other models where there are no or no sales in 
the ordinary course of trade. The requirement for domestic sales to be suitable for the use 
under the alternative approaches appears to be diffuse132.  
                                                 
130 The question whether method II) can be applied if only one other exporter exist has been raised before the Panel, where 
the AB overruled the Panels finding that the plural also included the singular, hence, if only one other exporter exist 
method II) cannot be utilized.   
131 In relation to the salmon case alt least trout should be accepted as the same general category of products whilst fishing 
rods would certainly not. The Panel has held that a narrow interpretation yielding the most comparable outcome is 
preferred. Thailand-H-Beams, in Vermulst (2005) p. 40 
132 There is no explicit requirement in law that the sales must pass a low volume test. Consequently it was held by the AB 
in the EC-Malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings from Brazil (paragraph 101) case, that there is no low volume test under 
art. 2.2.2 chapeau. Thus, the Commission can base SG&A and profits on low volume sales from any PNC (no 5 % 
threshold) when using method I). In Van Bael & Bellis (EC law) it is stated implicitly in p. 74 that a 5 % threshold does 
apply under art 2 (6) of the Basic Regulation.  
Article 2 A (6) of the Basic Regulation states that domestic sales must be in the ordinary course of trade in order to serve as 
basis for SG&A cost determination. Different from art. 2 (A) 2 there is no notion on low sales, hence domestic sale can be 
practically not-representative, but still serve as a basis for the determination of the SG&A costs and profits of other PNC’s 
and even other companies PNC’s. (page. 75, Bellis and p. 38 Vermulst).  
Whereas this applies to just the first approach or the alternatives appears to be unsettled. The Basic Regulation explicitly 
includes the term ordinary course of trade under method III), whilst the ADA is silent on any condition applying to the 
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When CNV is calculated it is implicitly given that not all products concerned (PNC’s) have 
representative domestic sales. It is obvious that the SG&A and profits of one product 
concerned is not necessarily representative for another product concerned under the same 
investigation. Using the alternatives magnifies the arbitrariness as the product then used as a 
benchmark is even more peripheral to the product under investigation and/or the company 
concerned. Furthermore, due to confidentiality companies cannot check the cost and profits 
data from competing companies. This makes it merely impossible to proactively avoid 
pricing behaviour which can lead to dumping charges. (Van Bael & Bellis, p 75).  
6.6.1 General and Administrative cost  
G&A133 costs are usually born by the company as a whole. Thus, costs are normally 
allocated to all of the company’s products on the basis of turnover. Where there is evidence 
that some product or category of product drive costs in another way than given by turnover 
the allocation might be adjusted accordingly. If there are G&A costs that relate solely to 
foreign activities these might be disregarded. (Van Bael and Bellis p. 71). 
 In United States - Softwood lumber from Canada the Panel first defines that “although in 
varying degrees…by their nature, G&A costs are costs that will normally affect all products 
produced or sold by a company…”134. In this interesting ruling the panel continues arguing 
that an unbiased and objective IA could treat legal settlement cost regarding hardboard 
(analogously: trout), which was not the product concerned, sold 1-18 years before the IP, as 
a general expense. The Panel then remarked that in respect to the nature of general and 
administrative costs, an inclusion of a portion of this cost to the general costs of softwood 
lumber (analogously: salmon) could be justified under ADA 2.2.2. Thus, the US approach of 
including this general cost item was found acceptable, as it could not be determined that 
there was no connection whatsoever between this significant cost and the production of 
softwood lumber. The Panel did not state that an opposite approach would have been 
incorrect.  
                                                                                                                                                      
sales used under the alternatives. The AB overruled the Panel which stated that under method II) sales outside the ordinary 
course of trade could be excluded and held that under method II) exclusion of sales not in the course of trade is not allowed, 
since the provision explicitly asks for a weighted average. There is no doubt an inconsistency between the Basic Regulation 
and the ADA at this point. Furthermore, it seems odd that an ordinary course test shall be performed on the general 
category of goods as this data is normally not provided alongside with the investigations.      
    
87
In large electrolytic aluminium capacitors from Japan, an exporter included in its SG&A a 
negative entry relating to income from financial investments which would have reduced 
SG&A if included. The Commission found that this deduction was not allowed since these 
revenues had no connection to the production of the product concerned (Müller, 1998, p 91). 
Similarly, in the ferrosilicon from Brazil case financial profits were not fully deductible as 
they did not solely relate to the production and sales of the product concerned.  
In the certain semi-finished products of alloy steel from Brazil and Turkey case, financial 
costs related to an exporters holding in affiliated companies, and with no operational relation 
to the production of the product concerned where excluded when determining SG&A. Thus, 
according to Müller et al (1998), a non-recurring, (negative) cost can only be included if 
related to the production or sales of the product concerned. (Van Bael & Bellis 2004 and 
Muller 1998). 
In synthetic staple fibres, Indonesian producers claimed that financial costs related to an 
organizational unit engaged in financial market activities should not be included in the 
SG&A. The Commission did not share this view, as the unit concerned performed activities 
which are normally carried out by a head-office. (Van Bael & Bellis, 2004, p.77). 
 
6.6.2 Investment activities 
Financial gains or losses due to investment activities would normally not fall into production 
costs. Still, it could be argued as seen by the Commission, that investment in related 
businesses e.g. other salmon producing companies as these investments can be seen as 
strategic with the potential of contributing to value adding for the core farming activities. 
Arguably, these costs should be attributed to general expenses. Totally unrelated investments 
should not be included in any COP at all and arguably either in the SG&A costs.  
6.6.2.1 Bad debt 
Losses on account receivables affect the company’s profitability. Even though these losses 
by their nature cannot be reflected in the actual selling prices they are undoubtedly a selling 
                                                                                                                                                      
133 Including  general financial expenses 
134 WT/DS 264 R Recital 7263. Recital 7246-7297 
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related cost which must be accounted for in the company’s long-run price setting. As the 
actual amounts of bad debt can only be verified a posteriori for the account to be included it 
must be based on standard percentages which would then be best “facts available”.   
‘Bad debt is purely related to sales and hence should not be considered as part of the 
COP’ (EU1 at recital xx)135. 
Apparently, the matter was not further discussed in the WTO salmon case. 
 
6.6.2.2 Cost of capital 
An issue that has surprisingly not yet been raised is the question of opportunity cost of 
owner’s equity. It should be a basic principle that the company’s financing should not affect 
the CNV.  
The point may well be illustrated with a brief example. 
Assume two companies Salmon Debt Ltc and Salmon Equity Ltc for simplicity we assume 
that their respective financing is 90 % debt and 10 % debt of a total equity of 100 each. At 
10 % interest rate and no other costs but interest costs, one salmon produced and sold in a 
single year would have a COP of NOK 9 at Salmon Debt Ltc and a COP of NOK 1 at 
Salmon Equity. Assuming a profit margin for the industry of a flat 10 % and no SG&A the 
CNV of the debt salmon would be NOK 9.9 and the CNV of salmon equity NOK 1.1. The 
return on owner’s equity for debt would then be 9 % and the return on owner’s equity for 
equity would be 0.1 %. This does obviously not make any sense for two reasons: 
  
I) the profit margin should be differentiated to reflect the variations in capital 
structure or; 
II) the opportunity cost of owner’s equity should be taken into account at a reasonable 
rate. 
A reasonable opportunity cost of capital could be adjusted in order to neutralize differences 
in capital structure between salmon farming companies.      
                                                 
135 Quotation of reasoning from one sampled Norwegian company, in official letter to the Commission 
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6.6.3 Sales costs 
The aspect of costs of the export product as if it was produced in the exporters home market 
is particularly relevant for sales costs, since e.g. advertising costs often differ substantially 
between national markets.   
In small-screen colour television receivers from Korea136 a producer argued that the 
advertising costs of the company were focused on the high-tech part of the product portfolio 
and not the product under investigation. The claim was thus that the advertising cost should 
not be allocated by turnover but allocated solely to the high tech products the advertisement 
was directed. The Commission disagreed on this view and stated that it was unrealistic to 
allocate advertisement costs to single models and not the product portfolio in its totality.  
6.7 Reasonable profits  
It might seem contradictory to calculate a profit margin under a dumping investigation. 
However, in practice, the higher the profit margins domestically, the higher the final 
dumping margin.  
Mark-up’s of 3-8 % are most common137. Profit margins are established according to the 
same hierarchical criteria which apply to the SG&A costs, section xx. The only distinction is 
that under “any reasonable method” (alternative VIII) profit margins must not exceed those 
found for the same general category or business sector (alternative III).   
In the salmon case a flat profit margin of 8 per cent was established and applied as the 
normal profit for the sampled companies when constructing NV.  This profit margin was 
said to be a minimum return to capital in that business138. The use of a flat profit margin on 
all salmon companies does, as mentioned above not take into account the differences in 
capital structure and value adding business activities. This appears to be flawed.  
                                                 
136 Müller, 1998, p. 90 
137 The most extreme case was a Thai firm which got a 48 % mark-up in its provisional determination using “any 
reasonable method”. This implicates that the company would have dumping margins in all cases where the comparable 
exports yielded less than 48 % profits. 
138 NOR1 at recital 379 
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Conclusions Part III 
The cases where constructed normal value is utilized imply that either there are no domestic 
sales or that there is an international cyclical slump or price volatility. Using actual costs and 
normal profits could be viable when industry is performing at average, but not in downturns. 
Furthermore, the CNV method pays no respect to the inability of firms to adjust to short term 
cost fluctuations, due to e.g. mortality or input prices fluctuations.  
The existence of a longer PP than IP, pose a problem, which solution depends upon the 
accuracy and method of accounting. The Commission cannot base its calculations on data 
which do not exist. The basic question is whether the COP shall be the one of the products 
sold or the cost of salmon produced in the IP. Even though there is no clear indication, the 
COP of the goods sold appears to be most in line with literature and intuition. 
Ideally, to find an economically sound full cost allocation, it is the author’s opinion that the 
CNV should be established using the actual production cost of the salmon sold in the IP, 
including all relevant costs for the entire production.  The results should neither depend on 
legal structure nor capital structure. 
Using PA and allocation of all-recurring costs to the right generation would be reasonable 
for production cost. Risk related costs of business, as mortality, should be included with a 
standard rate, while NRC should be allocated according to their contribution to the salmon 
sold in the IP. The remaining challenge is then related to prospective NRC which are clearly 
difficult to asses in advance. 
 
When using AA and cost based valuation of inventory the accuracy of the inventory will 
affect the COP as seen in the example. The valuation of biomass is a hot topic in accounting 
circles and both opinions and practices differ.  (Kredittilsynet, 2007)  
When using AA, and calculating the COP of the periods growth, the preciseness of the 
salmon volume in BB and EB will be essential. Remember that all costs are put in the 
nominator and that growth is put on the denominator. This is crucial as it is easy to forget 
that the accuracy of then growth figure is as important as the costs in the nominator. There is 
little doubt that this method is easier than calculating the actual cost, but at the same time it 
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is also obvious that the COP of the growth is not necessarily representative for the cost of 
goods sold in the period.  
The issue of NRC is challenging whatever method is utilized. The arbitrariness of using AA 
gets particularly pronounced when large NRC happens to fall within the AA, as was the case 
in the EC salmon case. The case of write-downs due to lower prospective salmon prices 
using AA is that it shall not be included. Using PA the COP shall not change due to NRC as 
this only relates to the charge of expenses in advance. The issue of severance payments and 
write-downs due to lower net present values of licences are intriguing questions with no 
clear cut answer.  
Using a full cost approach including a “reasonable” profit does, apart from the ambiguous 
calculation, not make any sense from an economic point of view. Firms, and especially 
agricultural firms, have a great volatility in returns. Taking volatility into account firms will, 
on average, be selling at dumped price half of the time. This obviously does not make sense, 
especially as dumping investigations target specific periods of time, where markets are 
depressed and returns below normal. 
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PART IV  
7 Final dumping determination 
7.1  Comparison 
The product under investigation sold in the domestic market and the product exported can be 
subject to a variety of factors affecting price comparability. Thus, the properly determined 
NV are not necessarily comparable to the relevant export prices without further adjustments.   
Law-makers have stressed the need to avoid double-adjustments. The adjustments done in 
the process of establishing or constructing NV and the export prices must be taken into 
account when ensuring the ultimate comparability.  
ADA art 2.4: “A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the NV” the 
Basic Regulation further elaborates: “Where the NV and the export price as established 
are not on such a comparable basis due allowance, in the form of adjustments, shall be 
made in each case, on its merits, for differences in factors which are claimed, and 
demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability”. 
Accordingly the investigating authority is obliged to make any necessary adjustments to 
ensure the “full” comparability between the prices of the products sold in the two markets. 
The concept of full comparability does, however, not include many factors related to 
supply, demand and competition, as if included would probably explain the firms pricing 
behaviour. 
The ADA does not list the factors for adjustment in the same way as the Basic Regulation. 
The Basic Regulation list of factors for adjustment was initially close-ended, but this 
changed when (k) was added by an amendment, Council Regulation 2331/96, and it is now 
open-ended. Thus, “every” demonstrable adjustment necessary to allow for a fair 
comparison must be taken into account. 
The Basic Regulation’s factors for adjustments are listed below from (a) to (k). The 
formulation is different from the ADA and the US anti-dumping act. One might legitimately 
wonder why an open-ended formulation needs an explicit list; the reason could be to help the 
investigating authority detect relevant areas where adjustments can rightfully be claimed. 
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Basic Regulation Art. 2 (10) selected extract: 
 (a) Physical characteristics 
An adjustment shall be made for differences in the physical characteristics of the 
product concerned. The amount of the adjustment shall correspond to a reasonable 
estimate of the market value of the difference (emphasis added).139
(b) Import charges and indirect taxes 
(c) Discounts, rebates and quantities 
(d) Level of trade 
(e) Transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs 
(f) Packing 
(g) Credit 
(h) After-sales costs 
(i) Commissions 
(j) Currency conversions 
(k) Other factors 
At present the most relevant difference between the ADA and the Basic Regulation is the 
inclusion of the market value of differences under (a) in the latter. This allowance in the 
Basic Regulation is important as the physical difference between e.g. a superior and an 
ordinary salmon, both with a potentially identical constructed NV, is considerably larger in 
market value than in variable cost. 
In the US municipal legislation, physical characteristics will be adjusted for according to the 
difference in variable cost, where appropriate, market value of price differences may also be 
considered. Thus, the US interpretation of the ADA could yield considerable differences in 
the adjustments in this particular case. There is no reason to believe that a pure variable cost 
adjustment approach would not be consistent with the ADA, hence, different 
implementations of the ADA can yield strikingly different results in particular cases without 
there necessarily being any erroneous implementation, but merely different implementation 
of the same general provision. 
                                                 
139 One must assume that the allowances to adjust for market value of physical differences is based on the market value of 
the relevant market.   
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Price differences due to minor but price significant physical differences, batch sizes etc. 
are not necessarily accounted for in the process of establishing NV and EXP. However, 
they can be adjusted for in the comparability process as seen in the example under: 
How this provision works in practice could be illustrated by a simple example:  
The product under investigation is salmon. Salmon Ltd produced 11 kg salmon during the 
IP, of which 1 kg is superior quality and 10 kg ordinary quality. (Two sub-products). 
Salmon Ltd sold one (1) kg superior HOG salmon to a domestic customer at NOK 25.  
The NV was then set to NOK/KG 25.  
Salmon Ltd sold ten (10) kg ordinary HOG salmon to a Community customer at NOK/KG 
21. The EXP was then set to NOK/KG 21  
One could assume dumping practice by Salmon Ltd before making due allowances to 
ensure fair comparability. However, when assuming that Salmon Ltd could demonstrate 
that the market value of one kg superior is NOK 2 higher then the market value of ordinary 
salmon and assuming that the Community exporter got a NOK/KG 2 quantity rebate, the 
matter changes considerably.  
As we can now see the CNV and EXP did not fairly reflect the actual prices charged by 
Salmon Ltd in the two markets. After due allowances are made no dumping margins can 
be established. Hence, Salmon Ltd’s pricing behavior is legitimate.     
 
To make a long shot, it would not be unreasonable to claim for adjustments due to other 
pricing relevant factors under (k) as many other factors in addition to those listed, affect 
price comparability between markets. If we could adjust for all pricing factors with non-
predatory economic justification, true dumping would be revealed. However, this would be 
very difficult to estimate quantitatively in practice. The methodological challenge of 
dumping is thus yet to be solved.  
7.2 Dumping margin  
Dumping margins can only be established when the NVs or its substitutes and the export 
prices are made comparable. As we can see from the example under, for each exporter an 
individual dumping margin is calculated for each sub-product, whereupon a weighted 
average dumping margin can be established for the product under investigation and thus also 
the company. 
The issue of dumping margins calculations will be examined in some detail as it gives 
important insight to the field of anti-dumping law. It is especially worth noting the discretion 
margins that are offered by these provisions. The historical development of the legal practice 
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through the panel’s rulings and the panel’s lack of discretion to pave the way for more 
economically rational interpretations show that the political aspects of anti-dumping law are 
predominant.  
Within anti-dumping law there are three different methods to calculate dumping margins. 
This has historically given investigating authorities wide discretion to choose the one 
yielding the highest dumping findings.   
The two preferred, symmetrical alternatives are: 
I) Weighted average to weighted average or “WW” 
Here the investigating authority compares the weighted average NV for each sub-
product with the weighted average EXP.  
II) Transaction to transaction or “TT” 
Here the investigating authority use comparable transactions on a transaction to 
transaction basis. 
In addition, under special circumstances an alternative unsymmetrical approach can be 
employed. 
III) Transaction to weighted average “W-T” 
Here the investigation authority use the weighted average NV and the EXP of each PNC on 
a transaction basis.  
The mathematical formula is: 
Dumping margin = [Normal Value - Export price (ex.works] / Export price (cif) 
According to Stephenson (2005), although base on a simple formula the actual calculation is 
“extremely complicated”. There is no reason to oppose his view.  
The reason different export prices are used is to make the application for customs authorities 
more manageable. Goods are valued at the CIF level for customs purposes and it is at this 
level of trade anti-dumping duty is applied (ibid)  
7.2.1 Inter model zeroing 
The possibly most debated and criticized practice, which has been, and is to some degree 
still in use, is the practice commonly known as “zeroing”. As previously explained business 
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normally involves multiple transactions within one or more sub-products, both domestically 
and in the export market. Assume, however, that within one product concerned let’s say 
fillets (PNC) there are three export sales of 1 kg fillet at respectively 18, 24, 16 between 
Salmon Ltd. and an independent EC customer and four domestic sales of respectively NOK 
17, 28, 15, 20. In the “WX” cases we must first find an average of the prices to establish NV 
which would be 20. 
As we get confirmed the dumping findings can vary considerably depending on the method 
applied. “Zeroing” means setting negative dumping margins to zero, as we can see this 
usually yields to findings of higher dumping margins. A logical argument that has been put 
forward is the analogy to car speed limits that are normally not seen as applying to average 
speeds but rather to upper speed extremes. This relates to the concept of “targeted 
dumping”140, which can, supposedly, be concealed by other above dumping level 
transactions if zeroing is not allowed.  
The first important judgement on zeroing was the bed linen141 case which condemned the 
use of zeroing when calculating dumping margins for the product under investigation.  Later 
a new judgement established stricter conditions upon the usage of the alternative calculation 
method (WT) which the EC priory used without any justification.  
The last years the most outspoken user of “zeroing” has been the US. In that connection a 
series of panel disputes has been launched among them the xx with the EC as complainant. 
Some of these cases are still to be concluded by the Panel and the Appellate Body. 
Notwithstanding, the tendency so far has been an incremental legal curbing of the 
investigating authorities possibility to exercise discretion.   
At present the final status of the zeroing practice is not yet settled with particularly the US 
still showing great reluctance to let go of this practice. In respect to recent rulings from the 
Panel the use of “zeroing” is now limited to “WT” cases where there has still been no 
                                                 
140 C- “258/84” at recital 25. 
141 Van Bael & Bellis (2004) p.123 
    
97
definitive ruling.     
 
Table 8: Zeroing on PNC level 
According to Van Baels and Bellis (2004) in the EC jurisprudence, dumping margins have 
traditionally been established either using the WW or the WT method. It might not be odd 
that the “TT” method is not in widespread use as there is normally no reason whatsoever to 
find a symmetrical pattern between export and domestic transactions.    
Such maneuvers have, at least previously, been labeled “targeted dumping142” by the EC, 
and is one of the reasons why there are three dumping margin calculations to choose from. 
According to this reasoning different methods can reveal different kinds of dumping.   
Apparently the moods have changed in this respect: “The zeroing methodology artificially 
inflates the level of anti-dumping duties by ignoring non-dumped sales which if included in 
the anti-dumping calculation would decrease or eliminate anti-dumping duties”. EU to 
request WTO panel in zeroing dispute - Brussels 14 may 2007. However, in Stevenson 
(2005), “some people believe that zeroing is totally prohibited - which is not true”. The legal 
standing of inter-model zeroing can still be seen as non-settled at least for some of its facets, 
including the asymmetrical approaches between the US and EU.  
                                                 
142 This could be to sell with particularly low prices in the main regional markets of the domestic industry concerned. In the 
salmon case this could be UK. The economic explanation to such regional differences can be e.g. related to different 
competition levels.  
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7.2.2 Inter model zeroing 
Salmon Ltd now produces 3 sub-products. The comparable prices for each model are as 
follows; after all necessary inter model adjustments are made143: 
 
Table 9: Dumping margin calculation with model zeroing  
The use of inter model zeroing is now explicitly outlawed by WTO jurisprudence 
(Stevenson, 2005). However, most likely it has been utilized in previous salmon disputes.  
As in the example dumping margins are normally given in pro cent of the NV. Margins 
under the de minimis144 level will not be subject to penalizations, as the de minimis level is 2 
% a margin of 3,7 % would have been just above that threshold. The dumping margin also 
establishes the roof for the duties imposable to offset injury.  
7.3 Dumping margin in EC salmon case  
The provisional final dumping margins of the ten sampled Norwegian companies are 
publicly available and listed in the following table, they are higher than the definitive. This 
table is however included as it also shows the injury margin: 
                                                 
143 CIF = ex factory, is assumed 
144 The de minimis principle. 
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                                                              (Source: Commission Regulation EC 628/2005) 
Table 10: Definitive dumping margins 
How the dumping margins affected the Norwegian salmon industry: 
      a) Sampled companies who did fully cooperate with the investigating authorities did get 
an individual dumping margin based on the data supplied by the company. As we can see 
dumping margins were provisionally between 6.8 % for Nordlaks Oppdrett A/S and 24.5 % 
for Follolaks A/S. 
b) Companies who were not sampled but did cooperate, got the weighted average of the 
sampled companies. As the ADA art 9 (i) explicitly states that “…authorities shall 
disregard for the purpose of this paragraph any zero and de minimis margins and 
margins established under the circumstances referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6” 
(facts available). This calculation is one of the conditions disputed in the WTO 
Salmon case. (WTO salmon case) 
c) The companies who not cooperate got the “residual” margin i.e. 20.9 %. Panel 
rulings have indicated that cooperation should pay-off, thus the dumping margin for 
non-cooperation should always be higher, or in this case the same, as for the exporter 
with the highest dumping margin (Stevenson, 2005).The reason for not setting the 
dumping margin higher in the salmon case is the relative high degree of cooperation 
by the Norwegian industry. On the other, if cooperation had been generally low 
individual dumping margins for non-cooperating companies could also be set by 
using the highest sub-product dumping margins or other methods based on “facts 
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available” with considerably higher dumping margins granted to punish for non-
cooperation. 145 
As can be seen from the table both individual dumping margins and individual dumping 
margins are established. The duty imposed shall in no case exceed the level needed to 
offset the injury suffered by the CI. Consequently, anti-dumping duties are imposed are 
normally imposed with the same value as the injury margin. However, the dumping duty 
must neither exceed the dumping margin.146  
7.4 Current status of the salmon trade 
The definitive dumping margins were adjusted downwards in the definitive Regulation147. 
However, the Commission used its discretion to replace ad valorem duties by MIP 
(Minimum import prices) and a fixed duty shortly after. These were put in place for all 
Norwegian salmon companies, except for Norlaks Oppdrett AS being subject to the de 
minimis rule. 148
There was also applied a tax on the sales under MIP to prevent circumvention of the MIP, 
this is expressed in the table under as a fixed duty to be paid in its totality when MIP are not 
respected. If salmon is dumped under the MIP when the fixed duty is applied an additional 
duty amounting to the difference shall also apply. The MIP are base on WFE standard. MIP 
do not affect the Norwegian industry unless the market price drops. MIP have been applied 
before by the EC and are not unfamiliar for Norwegian farmers. The measure is accurate but 
is easy to circumvent and earlier experiences have shown a great deal of inventiveness by 
Norwegian farmers (Asche et al. 2005). Asche further argues that the MIP should be 
dynamic in order to account for the downward trend of costs, this has not been the case so 
                                                 
145 The US has, in some cases, taken the extreme approach as to use the margins expressed in the complainants dumping 
allegations. (Muller et al., 1998) This is justified under the facts available provision: annex II (1) The authorities should 
also ensure that the party is aware that if information is not supplied within a reasonable time, the authorities will be free to 
make determinations on the basis of the facts available, including those contained in the application for the initiation of the 
investigation by the domestic industry”. (Emphasis added). The US wide use of facts available has been contested by the 
Panel (Stevenson, 2005) 
146 ADA Art. 9.1 
147 Council Regulation (EC) 85/2006 
148 Commission Regulation (EC) 1010/2005 
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far. The fixed duty shall apply when the MIP is not respected in order to avoid 
circumventions.149  
Presentation of farmed 
salmon 
Minimum import price 
EUR/kg net product
Fixed duty EUR/kg net 
product weight 
Whole fish, fresh, chilled or frozen 
 
EUR/KG 2,80 EUR/KG 0,40 
Gutted, head-on, fresh, chilled or 
frozen 
 
EUR/KG3,11 EUR/KG 0,45 
Other (including gutted, head-off), 
fresh, chilled or frozen EUR/KG 3,49 EUR/KG 0,50 
Whole fish fillets and fillets cut in 
pieces, weighing more than 300 g 
per fillet, fresh, chilled or frozen, 
skin on. 
 
EUR/KG5,01 
 
EUR/KG 0,73 
Whole fish fillets and fillets cut in 
pieces, weighing more than 300 g 
per fillet, fresh, chilled or frozen, 
skin off EUR/KG 
 
EUR/KG 6,40 
 
               EUR/KG 0,93 
Other whole fish fillets and fillets 
cut in pieces, weighing 300 g or 
less per fillet, fresh, chilled or 
frozen 
EUR/KG 7,73 
 EUR/KG 1,12 
                                                                                 
Table 11: Minimum import prices 
(Source: Council Regulation 85/2006) 
Currently the salmon market price is approaching the MIP level, after a long period of high 
salmon prices. The measures can soon become a major concern for Norwegian exporters as 
the price ceiling might be above the price which prevails in the EC market. Asche has 
previously expressed his concern for unilateral trade regulations as they have a distortion 
effect shifting market shares from Norwegian salmon to other exporting countries which can 
capture market shares selling at under MIP. The threat of trade restrictions will however, to 
certain degree, be disciplining on these market operators.   
                                                 
149 Council regulation (EC) 85/2006 at recital 129 
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7.5 The ADA, the salmon case and high politics 
  
Figure 17: High politics implications for salmon case and ADA 
As described in the previous section there are diverging political views on reforms of the 
ADA. Whilst there might be agreement on the need for adjustments neither the direction nor 
the strength of legal reforms is agreed upon. As the domestic tribunals and the Panel have no 
or at list very limited power to pave the way for legal evolution, the faith of the ADA lays on 
the shoulders of the politicians of the world’s leading trading nations. 
 The two big rectangles shows the relative political stand between the major block WTO of 
subscribers, which have different political agendas depending on their traditional stand as 
either AD users or AD victims (importers/exporters). Norway is not an active user, whilst 
the US is.   
Level one shows the discretion margin historically offered by the IA. As IA by nature are 
biased they will take full advantage of the discretion margins which are offered by the 
agreement. This discretion has somewhat been somewhat constrained by Panel and domestic 
tribunal rulings. This is shown as the dotted line.  
Level two is the current status which offers IA lesser discretion than before. The Norwegian 
allegations brought for the panel would probably not have succeeded a decade ago, however 
as discretion margin is now smaller Norway might get support on some points where the IA 
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discretion margin is disputed. These points are given by the intersection between the 
allegation circle and the dotted line.   
Level three is the expected gradual evolution of ADA following the Doha round. Even 
though no progress is certain, if there is progress it will certainly reduce IA discretion 
further. 
Lever four is reserved the remote future as it depends on considerable political will of 
reform. In a world which is far from fully integrated and political blade rubbing in trade 
questions is common, it is unlikely that politicians will give up one of their principal 
protective measures. The last level will be more in line with economic rationale implying an 
anti-dumping agreement merged with or replaced by competition law following then a 
consideration of objective close to the one of domestic law.  
What is then the main insight from this discussion? 
I) Anti-dumping law is a juridical playing field where the rules are set by political 
compromise. Tribunals and Panels cannot take political side and make interpretations 
which limit the discretion offered by the ADA150.  
III) With respect to the WTO Salmon case one should not expect the Panel to deal 
with any injustice inherent in the ADA. The Panel will only and prudently 
assess whether the Commissions exercised discretion is within the one offered 
by the ADA.  This is largely a de jure question and should be understood 
separately from any economic analysis of the measures “fairness”.151 
The Doha negotiations round has not yet been concluded. Generally there appears to be little 
progress and no results can be expected in the nearest future.  
                                                 
150 On the contrary, the EC recalls that the Members have expressly agreed that panels "cannot add to or diminish the rights 
and obligations provided in the covered agreements." (EU2, recital 51), making reference to the Vienna convention on 
treaties Art. 32. 
151 ADA Art. 17.6 (i) (ii): “..If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, 
even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned; 
Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the 
panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible 
interpretations”. 
151 Journal of World Trade (2004) 
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The Norwegian salmon case is currently run by the Norwegian government in the WTO. 
A Panel report is expected to be circulated by September 2007, this is already a delay as the 
report was initially expected to be ready by May 2007. If the Panels report is appealed the 
process of appeal shall normally take no more than three months, meaning a final 
determination could be expected by start of 2008152.   
Final conclusion 
I was once told that a fundamental juridical principle is that it is better to let 99 thieves go 
free than imprisoning one innocent person. In anti-dumping it appears that someone took this 
argument the wrong way153. Without saying that anti-dumping should put hurdles that high, 
recognizing that dumping might occur, there is something basically illogical about a measure 
which targets normal business practice as condemnable and unfair. Whereas competition law 
targets anti-competitive behaviour, anti dumping law has no mission statement and targets 
whatever behaviour falls within the legal definition of dumping.  
The Norwegian salmon industry has been no exception to the allegations of unfair 
behaviour. Even though Norway aggregately has a considerable market share in the EU, 
individual firms are price takers in a highly competitive industry with constant pressure on 
rationalization and continuous shakeouts. Consequently, the industry assessment gives more 
support to protectionist motives than to predatory ones. 
At a more technical level the Anti-dumping Agreement is pervaded by ambiguity which is 
perfectly suited for findings of fictitious dumping by biased investigating authorities. 
Especially the sales below cost test and the practice of zeroing are strikingly illogical for any 
other purpose than dumping margin inflation.  
In the WTO salmon case many interesting questions have been raised. Even though the Anti-
dumping Agreement itself is economically flawed, it does not preclude the use of economic 
thinking in its application. Even though the foundation wall is weak, sketches for the house 
can still be drawn. This is what has been done in the constructed normal value section. One 
                                                 
152 WT/DS337/5 
153 Recalling Hyun (1998) the figure is one out of ten. 
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important and generally valid finding is that legal organization and capital structure ceteris 
paribus should not affect the estimation of a cost of production. 
However, what finally happens in the courts is hampered by political constraints and the lack 
of mission statement, forcing judges to rule by the strict wording of ambiguous laws. 
Reviewing case law shows that these interpretations can turn in both parties favour and also 
reveal the inherent need for an economically rational benchmark, to test the merits of each 
case.     
Notwithstanding, provisional flaws and biased investigation authorities, firms have a legal 
right to engage proactively in the anti-dumping process - this opportunity should not be 
ignored as it can impact final outcome. 
Finally, there is no reason to believe that anti-dumping will undergo any fundamental change 
in the recent future. The anti-dumping measures applicability and thus the political 
indignation can only be changed by offering a better alternative to anti-dumping. Here the 
economic profession has certainly a considerable contribution to make.  Meanwhile the field 
of anti-dumping will continue providing the world with protectionist measures justified by 
legal subtleties muffled up with quasi-economic rhetoric.    
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Appendix II 
Overview of thesis scope and Basic Regulation Articles: 
EC Basic Regulation articles Relevance for 
this paper
Art 1. Principles Pri I 
Pri I 
Pri I 
Pri II 
Pri I 
Art 2. Determination of dumping 
A: NV 
B: Export price 
C: Comparison 
D: Dumping Margin  Pri I 
Art 3. Determination of injury Pri II 
Art 4. Definition of community PRI III 
Art 5. Initiation of proceedings PRI III 
Art 6. The investigation PRI III 
Art 7. Provisional measures NO 
Art 8. Undertakings NO 
Art 9. Termination without 
measures; 
i i i f d fi i i
PRI III 
Art 10. Retroactivity NO 
Art 11. Duration, review and refunds NO 
Art 12. (No heading) NO 
Art 13. Circumvention NO 
Art 14. General provisions Pri III 
Art 15. Consultations NO 
Art 16. Verification visits NO 
Art 17. Sampling Pri II 
Art 18. Non-cooperation Pri II 
Art 19. Confidentiality NO 
Art 20. Disclosure NO 
Art 21. Community Pri III 
Art 22-24 Miscellaneous NO 
 
PRI I   = Main focus of this paper 
PRI II  = Secondary focus of this paper 
PRI III = Briefly touched upon to give context 
NO      = Not relevant for paper, implications not; or (just implicitly); mentioned in paper  
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Appendix V 
 
                 (Source: Fiskerdirektoratet, 2006)  
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